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This thesis constructs a DSGE model of the New Zealand economy based on Iacoviello
(2005). Its key innovation is the introduction of an investor property sector that allows
consideration of the loan-to-value (LVR) restrictions that the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand (RBNZ) recently implemented. These tools were employed in order to mitigate
the risks associated with highly leveraged investors with multiple exposures to the
housing market.
With the introduction of an investor sector, both patient and impatient households
are given the choice between owning and renting property. This decision is affected by
house prices relative to rental prices, the expected capital gains for home ownership, and
any LVR restrictions that the impatient households may face. By contrast, property
investors are assumed to have the choice between investing in capital or investing in
housing. This model therefore shows the impact of the trade off between investing in
housing and investing in capital on other variables in the economy.
The model shows that LVR restrictions work to stabilise output in the event of a mon-
etary policy or housing preference shock. In addition, the presence of LVR restrictions
affects the distribution of housing to different agents in the economy. Although risk is
not explicitly modelled in this framework, this suggests LVR restrictions may increase
financial stability by encouraging greater activity in the housing market from less risky
agents (such as patient households in this framework).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis introduces a framework for examining the impact of loan-to-value (LVR)
restrictions on the transmission of monetary policy and the business cycle. It is timely as
many central banks, including the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, have started adding
macroprudential tools to their financial stability toolkits. These tools are aimed at
mitigating the build-up of systemic risk during the business cycle and ensuring systemic
resilience in the event of a crisis. Due to the impact these tools have on both the
availability and price of credit, they have clear implications for both the business cycle
and the transmission of monetary policy through interest rates.
With the growing popularity of macroprudential tools at central banks, there has been
a recent growth in literature that considers the impact of these tools on monetary
policy transmission and the business cycle. Given the popularity of general equilibrium
frameworks for modelling the business cycle, many papers have incorporated these tools
into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
The model presented in this thesis contributes to the literature by constructing a DSGE
model based on Iacoviello (2005) that is able to consider how the application of LVR
restrictions on different agents affects the business cycle. As the name implies, LVR
restrictions limit the amount a borrower can borrow to a certain percentage of their
underlying collateral, often housing. High LVR lending is considered riskier as the
lender has less of a buffer on the loan in the event of a downturn in the price of the
underlying asset. If a high LVR borrower is unable or unwilling to continue servicing
the loan, it is more likely that the lender will suffer a loss, as the value of the borrower’s
equity in the collateral plus whatever can be earned from its sale may not meet the
value of the loan.
This thesis builds on Iacoviello (2005)’s model by introducing a rental market for hous-
ing and investors to that model. In this model, investors have the choice between
investing in capital and investing in housing, with the choice determined by which has
the highest expected capital gain and rental yield. As investors do not gain utility
1
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from housing itself, they treat houses as financial assets. From a policy perspective, the
inclusion of investors allows the model to consider the effect of investor-specific LVR
restrictions on the business cycle, as well as evaluating the impact of standard LVR
restrictions that do not distinguish borrower type.
By contrast, households gain utility from housing and are subject to exogenous hous-
ing preference shocks. These shocks approximate bubble-like behaviour to the extent
that they cause an idiosyncratic deviation of the utility gained from housing with no
corresponding increase in the asset value of housing.
As noted above, this analysis is particularly pertinent to New Zealand where the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) recently implemented a macroprudential toolkit to enable
it to combat the financial stability risks associated with high domestic house price
inflation. In 2013, the RBNZ implemented an LVR restriction that limited the amount
of new lending banks could undertake above an 80% LVR. At the time, it was noted
that this restriction would be unlikely to bind investors who could withdraw equity
from current residential holdings to invest in additional properties.
Despite meeting the residual LVR thresholds, such borrowers are nevertheless risky, as
their exposure to single markets may make them more likely to withdraw quickly in the
event of a sudden downturn in property prices. In addition, if mortgage repayments are
reliant on rental returns, a downturn in rental prices could also affect borrowers’ ability
to service their mortgages. Given these concerns, the RBNZ implemented a further
wave of LVR restrictions targeted specifically at housing investors in 2015.
This thesis is organised as follows. Section II reviews the literature on housing in DSGE
models, before discussing the findings from papers that explicitly incorporate macro-
prudential tools. Section III introduces a simple Bayesian VAR (BVAR) to highlight
the empirical relationship between housing and the business cycle in New Zealand and
to note key relationships that the DSGE model should capture.
Section IV introduces the model, highlighting its key features, with further exposition
and derivations available in the appendix. Section V discusses the model’s calibration,
comparing its steady state results to key relationships in the New Zealand data and to
the impulse responses derived in the BVAR.
Section VI of the thesis analyses the impulse responses for key model variables to dif-
ferent shocks in the model. Some of these shocks are standard, such as the monetary
policy shock, while others are more idiosyncratic to the literature, such as the hous-
ing preference shock. This analysis allows us to explore the transmission of shocks
originating in different sectors through the model. The housing preference shock is of
particular interest as it affects the utility patient and impatient households gain from
owning housing. This allows us to observe how an idiosyncratic increase in demand for
housing, which is unrelated to model fundamentals, affects other real variables.
Most importantly, this section explores the impact of different levels of LVR restrictions
3
on the transmission of shocks to agents within the economy in order to explore the
business cycle properties of LVR restrictions. The baseline case is assumed to be a 95%
LVR restriction imposed on both impatient households and investors. The next case is
a restriction of 80% on impatient households while leaving the restriction for investors
unchanged from the baseline. This is equivalent to the LVR restriction imposed by
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 2013. The final scenario retains the 80% LVR
restriction on impatient households and in addition imposes a 70% LVR restriction on
investors. This last scenario is a model equivalent to the LVR restrictions imposed by
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 2015. The final section of the paper concludes.
The scenario analysis in Section VI reveals that LVR restrictions reduce output fluctu-
ations in response to monetary policy shocks. This is especially the case with investor-
specific LVR restrictions, where the investor quickly divests property in response to the
increased interest rate and then only gradually rebuilds their housing stock following
the shock. As a result of these dynamics, increased interest rates suppress investor
activity far longer in the presence of an investor-specific LVR restriction than without
it.
With a positive housing preference shock, the constraint on the capacity of investors
to borrow in response to the shock results in smoother consumption and output paths.
Crucially, as consumption remains higher with the investor-specific LVR restriction,
capital investment is higher and smoother than in other scenarios. Although risk anal-
ysis is beyond the scope of the model, the redistribution of housing toward patient
and impatient households in response to the shock implies an improvement in finan-
cial stability. This assertion is supported by Kelly and O’Malley (2014)’s analysis that
suggests that investors are at higher risk of default in the event of a downturn.
In response to a positive technology shock, an investor-specific LVR is similarly effective
at smoothing investor consumption and output by moderating investor activity in the
housing market. Although there is a sustained decline in capital investment following
the technology shock, there is a slightly stronger increase in housing investment in the
medium term in the presence of LVR restrictions. The paths for house prices, inflation
and the interest rate in response to this shock remain broadly unchanged by the use of
LVR instruments. Again, this implies that LVR restrictions allow the interest rate to
moderate inflation while minimising fluctuations in output.
The presence of LVR restrictions do not materially alter the transmission of a positive
cost-push shock to real variables. However, as with other shocks, the presence of LVR
restrictions has important implications for the distribution of housing among agents.
In particular, investor housing ownership is significantly reduced in the presence of
an investor-specific LVR restriction following a cost-push shock relative to scenarios
without an LVR restriction.
Comparing the steady state of the model under different LVR assumptions also pro-
vides insight how permanent application of an LVR restriction would affect key housing
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market variables in the long term. From steady state analysis, it is possible to derive
the following stylised facts about the long term impacts of LVR restrictions on the
economy:
(a) Regardless of the agent that an LVR restriction constrains, it leads to a decline in
residential investment to GDP, leading to higher consumption in the economy.
(b) Investor specific LVR restrictions lead to decreased rental supply and increased
rents.
(c) Impatient household LVR restrictions lead to a severe contraction in the percentage
of housing with a mortgage.
(d) Implementation of any LVR restriction causes investors’ borrowing to fall, regard-
less of the agent the restriction constrains.




The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework has become a standard
means of modelling in central banks around the world. The key advantage of this
framework is that it allows one to observe how a shock in one sector flows through to,
and affects, the rest of the economy.
Starting from the simple three equation model described in Gertler et al. (1999), DSGE
models have grown in size and complexity in order to capture the impact of a variety
of shocks on different sectors in the economy. Since the GFC, there has been increased
focus on incorporating a housing market and the risks associated with credit booms in a
general equilibrium framework. Recent empirical studies have noted the interconnection
between house prices and GDP, with busts in the housing market being associated with
large and persistent falls in economic activity (Jorda et al. (2015)).
With the GFC came a call for improved financial regulation to reduce the risk of, and
mitigate the losses arising from, another financial crisis. These measures have included
changes to the instruments that can be considered bank capital for regulatory purposes
and enhanced liquidity requirements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)).
Coupled with these measures, many countries have considered supplementary policies
aimed at minimising systemic risk in the financial system in general. Where the tradi-
tional focus of prudential regulation has been the risks faced by individual institutions,
the GFC forced regulators to recognise that there may be broader risks that need to be
recognised and addressed contemporaneously. Macro-prudential regulation recognises
that the interconnectedness of the financial system means that even if a bank is well-
capitalised for the risks it faces, it may be assuming a sub-optimal level of risk from a
system-wide point of view (Borio (2003)).
Macroprudential regulation is aimed at improving financial stability either by miti-
gating the impact of external shocks on the system (Allen and Wood (2006)) or by
increasing the resilience of the system to shocks that are endogenously generated in the
system (Schinasi (2004)). Although some have argued that avoiding ‘bubbles’ could be
5
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a mandate for macroprudential policy (Landau (2009)), it is generally accepted that
the aim should be the stable provision of financial services rather than avoiding bub-
bles or credit imbalances. As the dot-com bubble illustrated, such imbalances do not
automatically result in a reduction of credit supply that precipitates a real contraction.
As such, it is not appropriate to conclude that a bubble in one sector is by nature a
financial stability risk to be addressed (Bank of England (2009)).
In this context, the greater emphasis on regulations that explicitly address housing
market risks is unsurprising given the GFC was driven by the collapse of house prices
in the United States and the default of many mortgage backed securities (MBS). Many
regulators have introduced policies to reduce risky loans to the housing sector and/or
minimise the systemic losses that could result from a collapse in house prices. These
tools are applied similarly across all institutions, rather than traditional prudential
policies that may be applied differentially depending on the size or systemic importance
of the institution.
2.1 Systemic risk and macroprudential policy
As an example of systemic risk, consider a period of elevated house price inflation
due to low interest rates. In such circumstances, lower rates would reduce the cost of
borrowing while lowering the discount factor applied to the income stream from rental,
which would increase the asset value of housing. As a result of the increased underlying
return to housing, house prices and rental prices would rise. Note that the expected
return from housing would be the rental yield and any expected capital appreciation of
the house.
At the same time, low interest rates would render the yield from holding money low,
which would increase incentives for those that own housing to withdraw equity from
their current housing loans in order to invest in more housing. Such circumstances
could lead to greater borrowing and increased demand for housing, which would in
turn increase house prices and the expected returns from capital gain.
However, if circumstances were to reverse and interest rates were to rise, those that
borrowed heavily may not be able to continue servicing their loans, especially if their
income is a small fraction of their mortgage. As borrowers start to default on their loans,
more houses would become available on the market as banks attempt to sell them in
order to recover the value of the loans. The added supply of house in the market would
reduce house prices. Contemporaneously, the yield on housing as an investment would
fall as the discount rate applied to rents would be higher, which would put further
downward pressure on house prices.
If borrowers expect future interest rate increases and lower house prices, even those that
could afford to continue servicing their loans may choose to sell while house prices are
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still relatively high. This would especially be the case for investors as their only return
from owning the house is rental and the potential capital gain. Empirical evidence
suggests that investors are more likely to strategically default on their loans than owner-
occupiers (McCann (2014)).
Increased supply of housing would further depress house prices, reducing the value of all
houses as underlying assets. This would increase the risk associated with these loans.
As house prices fall, the value of houses as security would decrease for all residential
loans in banks’ books.
A falling property value relative to value of the loan will increase key measures of
risk associated with these loans (for example, loan to value ratios), which will in turn
require banks to hold more capital against these loans. This could have two related
consequences. First, to the extent that bank capital is ‘expensive’ (see Admati et al.
(2010) for discussion) banks will be disincentivised to continue holding these loans, and
may attempt to refocus their lending on a different sector. Second, the increased risk
associated with such loans may be outside the risk appetite of a bank’s board, which
may then require the bank to reduce their exposure to these types of loans.
In either case, if a bank cannot sell the loans to another mortgage provider (likely the
case if all banks are facing the same market) then they will have to foreclose on them in
order to recover what they can from the loans. This creates a cycle that could threaten
the stability of the system if banks are highly exposed to the collapsing sector.
Macro-prudential policies are aimed at guarding against the build-up of this excessive
risk in the system. Such policies may include counter-cyclical capital requirements and
LVR restrictions. Counter-cyclical capital requirements require banks to hold more
capital at the peak of the economic cycle that can then be used to absorb losses in
a downturn. As described in the introduction, LVR restrictions limit the volume of
lending that a bank may undertake above a given LVR.
In New Zealand, in response to the increasing house price inflation, the Reserve Bank
has implemented a LVR restriction on banks’ lending that requires that no more than
10% of new residential mortgage lending be above 80% LVR (Reserve Bank of New
Zealand (2013)). Recognising the additional risk associated with investor lending, the
RBNZ added an additional restriction on new residential mortgage lending that requires
investors (as opposed to owner-occupiers) to have a minimum 30% deposit on residential
properties (Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2015)).
2.2 Interaction between policies
This paper seeks to explore the likely impact of different agent-specific LVR restrictions
in a DSGE framework. Although there are other frameworks that may be more ideal
for considering the impact of these policies in isolation (i.e. frameworks that allow
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borrower default through time) the benefit of using a DSGE model is that it allows one
to observe the interactions with monetary policy and the business cycle.
In some cases, monetary and macro-prudential policies move in the same direction
and are complementary to each other’s purposes. For example, during a booming
economy with a high output gap, increased inflationary pressure and high house prices,
the central bank would likely respond by tightening monetary policy and tightening
macroprudential policy if there is risk of excessive credit growth.
However, it may also be the case that monetary policy and macroprudential policy
may operate in a way where they are in conflict with each other. This could be the
case where there is a slowing economy, with potentially negative output gap and low
inflationary pressure, which requires stimulus through an easing in monetary policy.
At the same time, limitations in supply of, or increased demand for, housing may lead
to higher house prices, which could require more restrictive macroprudential policy if
there were excessive risks associated with lending to that sector.
In such case, the monetary policy easing required to address the decline in demand
and inflation in the rest of the economy may also worsen issues associated with house
price inflation. Lower interest rates lower the cost of servicing mortgages as well as
increasing the present-value of future rental payments so would be expected to increase
house prices. In such circumstances, the interest rate would be in conflict with the
macroprudential obligations of the central bank. These circumstances described are
similar (at a high level) to the issues currently facing the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Papers including Angelini et al. (2012) have explored welfare implications of cooper-
ation or autonomous decision making by independent macroprudential and monetary
policy authorities. But where macroprudential and monetary policy making powers are
vested in the same institution it is possible to consider the application of both policies
jointly. The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework to consider the impacts of
exogenously set LVR restrictions on monetary policy and the business cycle.
Other papers have considered alternative models for macroprudential and monetary
policy decision making. These studies have sought to investigate whether these policies
should be conducted within the same institution, and if so, by the same decision makers
(see Svensson (2016), De Paoli and Paustian (2013), and Collard et al. (2012)). For the
purposes of this thesis, I take the joint decision making model of the Reserve Bank as
given, but I note that alternative models could be an area of further research, especially
if alternative policy rules were to be considered.
2.3 DSGE in modelling systemic risk
DSGE models have a number of advantages for use in modelling the business cycle
implications of the application of macroprudential tools, but they also have limitations
2.3. DSGE IN MODELLING SYSTEMIC RISK 9
that should be acknowledged. One of the key advantages of DSGE models is that
the short term and long term impact of different policy measures can be quantified
both at equilibrium and in response to different exogenous shocks. This allows them
to take into account spillovers through time (dynamic effects) and in different markets
(general equilibrium effects). Crucially, as DSGE models include different markets
within the economy, they allow one to see the transmission of policy changes across
variables and markets. This is very useful as it enables us to vary monetary policy
and macroprudential rules within the model in order to assess the impact of different
combinations of rules across sectors.
Another benefit of applying a DSGE approach is that it allows for micro-founded iden-
tification of the channels through which different effects take place. These structural
foundations provide internal consistency to the model, although at the cost of less flex-
ibility than in purely data-based approaches. In contrast, unrestricted multivariate
data models, such as VARs, may fit data very well but fail to provide any economic
intuition as to why certain relationships are observed to exist between variables. Given
the very short time series of data available on the application of LVR restrictions in
New Zealand, such models would offer little insight into business cycle dynamics in this
case.
The limitations of DSGE models in matching data should not be overstated. Although
unrestricted multivariate models may better fit the data in sample, Smets and Wouters
(2003) show that an estimated DSGE model is able to compete with standard unre-
stricted time series models in out-of-sample forecasting.
However, the general equilibrium properties of DSGE models do place limitations on
their use for modelling financial frictions. In particular, a model has to be calibrated or
estimated based on parameters at a ‘normal’ point in the business cycle so as to allow a
unique equilibrium. This may limit the usefulness of the model for describing impacts
if there is a change in underlying parameters, as may be the case following a major
financial crisis. Additional complications arise when estimating a model. For example,
data is detrended when fitting the model to the data, which eliminates outliers and
results in a stable series with no structural breaks.
These models are also typically solved using linearisation techniques that mean there
can be no discontinuity between normal times and crisis periods - a result that is at
odds with the observation that we would expect for nonlinearities to be prevalent during
crisis periods. Therefore, some argue that systemic risks are outliers that are not able
to be considered in this framework (Freixas et al. (2015)).
Although the DSGE framework may not be amenable to the discussion of systemic risk,
it should be emphasised that the purpose of this paper is to highlight the impact of
LVR restrictions on the business cycle during normal times. Therefore, even though
the efficacy of the instruments themselves in addressing systemic risk may be beyond
the scope of analysis in a DSGE model, DSGE is an appropriate framework for eval-
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uating their impact on the business cycle. Furthermore, even with the limitations of
DSGE, it is possible to draw conclusions about the impact different policies have on
the distribution of property among different agents and therefore the instruments’ risk
mitigation properties.
2.3.1 Other areas of research exploring housing and the busi-
ness cycle
It should be noted that DSGE is not the only framework used to consider the impacts
financial frictions on housing and risk. There is a developing literature that uses in-
complete markets models to explore effects of changing house prices on other real and
financial variables. An extensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this
thesis, but there are some contributions that should briefly be noted.
Favilukis et al. (2010) incorporate aggregate business cycle risk and heterogeneity in
bequests into an incomplete markets framework with collateral constraints. Within this
framework they find that a relaxation of collateral constraints leads to a large boom
in house prices due to declining housing risk premia. In this framework, they find that
low interest rates cannot explain high house prices.
Similarly, Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) use an incomplete markets framework to consider
the impact housing and debt have on the volatility of the macroeconomy in a model
that includes aggregate risk. However, as that model has no risk-free asset, it does not
consider the impact of risk premia on the economy. Likewise, Campbell and Hercowitz
(2005) consider the impact of different collateral constraints in a general equilibrium
model with collateralised debt and heterogeneity in time preferences, but again there
is no role for risk premia in explaining economic fluctuations in the model.
The finding of Favilukis et al. (2010) that collateral constraints have a large impact
on house prices is doubted by Kiyotaki et al. (2011). Using a life-cycle model of a
productive economy, they find that expected productivity and world interest rates have
large impacts on house prices, but that changing financing constraints only has a limited
effect on house prices. Likewise, Sommer et al. (2013) similarly find that low interest
rates and higher incomes can account for much of the observed house price-to-rent ratio,
while relaxing collateral constraints only plays a minor role.
There are few papers that incorporate a rental market for housing into a DSGE model.
Ortega et al. (2011) incorporates a rental market using a CES aggregator similar to
that used in this paper but with the aim of evaluating the impact of different housing
subsidies on price in the rental market. In my research, I have not found a paper that
includes a rental market in order to evaluate the impact of macroprudential tools on
rental prices.
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2.4 Financial frictions in DSGE models
Since the GFC there has been an increased interest in models that explicitly incorporate
financial frictions into general equilibrium models. This has developed the literature in
three related ways.
First, there has been a proliferation of models that include credit effects on the real
economy, typically through the introduction of external finance premia. This literature
developed from Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1999) who incorpo-
rated a financial accelerator mechanism into a standard real business cycle model. This
mechanism makes the cost of credit depend on the underlying assets of the borrower.
Aoki et al. (2004) applied this literature to the housing market by using housing as the
underlying asset rather than focussing strictly on entrepreneurs’ net worth. Note that
the only limitation on borrowing in these external finance models is the cost of credit
or external finance premium that is applied given the agents’ underlying assets. That
is, provided the borrower can finance the loan, there is no limitation on the quantity of
borrowing that may take place within the model.
The other popular method of including financing constraints in these models has been
through use of collateral constraints. Such models have been particularly useful for
answering questions about the impact that a contraction in the consumer and finan-
cial sectors may have on the real economy. Building on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
these models explicitly limit the amount of borrowing to a certain percentage of the
underlying collateral of the loan. Thus, a downturn in the price of underlying assets
limits borrowing in the current period, which delays the return to equilibrium in future
periods. The addition of collateral to these models allows one to directly evaluate the
impact of LVR restrictions.
Third, there has been development in models that incorporate credit spreads through
the explicit modelling of a banking sector. These models allow the inclusion of credit
spreads through modelling the wedge between bank lending rates and the risk-free
rate. Some models go further to consider the role of bank capital in business cycle
fluctuations and the propagation of systemic risk. Each of these strands of literature
will be discussed in detail below.
These strands of literature have grown in popularity at central banks that have sought
to better understand the supply and demand influences of house prices, housing in-
vestment, and the wealth effect of rising house prices on consumption. Central banks
and international organisations that have developed models to address these matters
include the Federal Reserve in the United States (Liu et al. (2013)), the European
Central Bank (Lombardo and McAdam (2012)), Bank of England (Tayler and Zilber-
man (2016)), Bank of Canada (Alpanda et al. (2014)), the International Monetary Fund
(Prakash et al. (2012) and Benes et al. (2014)), Riksbank (Walentin (2014)) and Central
Bank of Ireland (Clancy and Merola (2014)).
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2.4.1 The External Finance Premium Channel
The external finance premium is the the difference between the price that debtors must
pay to creditors and the opportunity cost of using internal funds. Empirical evidence
suggests that the cost of external funding is almost always higher than using internal
resources (De Graeve (2008)). One cause of this premium is the information asymmetry
faced by lenders who have less information than borrowers about the status or prospects
of success of an investment project.
The cost of remedying this information asymmetry can be described with project mon-
itoring costs, as assumed by Diamond (1965). Akerlof (1970) showed that the presence
of information asymmetries could in the extreme prevent a market from existing at all.
Responding to this work, Townsend (1979) proposed an optimal contract to address
information asymmetries and the associated monitoring costs. In this contract, the
borrower reports the outcome of the project to the lender, who then only requires an
audit of the project result if the reported profit is lower than the monitoring thresh-
old. The monitoring threshold is a decreasing function of the borrower’s capital, as a
wealthier borrower could pay the agreed return on investment regardless of losses on
the project. Conversely, the monitoring threshold is increasing in the risk-free rate,
which represents the opportunity cost of investing in the project.
This contract design was incorporated into Bernanke and Gertler (1989). In that paper,
entrepreneurs borrow from lenders in order to produce capital through risky investment
projects in an overlapping generations model. The outcome of a project is only freely
visible to the entrepreneurs, while lenders have to pay monitoring costs to observe the
outcome. The combination of uncertainty and monitoring costs in this model generates
a positive external finance premium on loanable funds, which limits the ability of en-
trepreneurs to borrow. Crucially, this paper showed that the agency costs of borrowing
are inversely related to borrower’s net worth. That is, in good times, improved borrower
balance sheets increase investment demand as the cost of credit falls. The opposite ef-
fects amplify the resulting contraction in bad times. With its counter-cyclical external
finance premium, this model laid the foundations of the financial accelerator literature
that would follow.
Following the overlapping generations model of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carl-
strom and Fuerst (1997) embedded the frictions introduced by Townsend (1979) into
an infinite-horizon setting in a standard real business cycle (RBC) model.
This literature was extended again by Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG) who incorpo-
rated an external finance premium into a standard New-Keynesian DSGE model. BGG
showed that there is an increasing relationship between the premium on external funds
and the capital to wealth ratio. The paper abstracts from firm reputation by assuming
that the producers of capital face random termination through time. Given the model’s
relative simplicity, the authors noted there were many possible extensions that could
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be made to the model, including the incorporation of nominal debt, a banking sector
and open economy features.
One of the first papers to explore these additional dimensions of research was Christiano
et al. (2004). That paper expanded the BGG model to include labour market features
and a banking system. Using their model, they successfully replicate many features
of the data from the Great Depression. Rather than focussing on capital, Aoki et al.
(2004) modify the framework to incorporate housing that produces housing services.
Motto et al. (2010) incorporated nominal debt into the model to evaluate the impact
of nominal debt contracts on the financial accelerator mechanism. They find that the
financial accelerator mechanism is only of minor importance in explaining business cycle
fluctuations where there were nominal debt contracts.
Despite the theoretical attractiveness of the financial accelerator mechanism, some stud-
ies have doubted its empirical relevance. Meier and Muller (2005) use a minimum dis-
tance strategy (similar to Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Christiano et al. (2005))
to match the impulse responses of a medium scale DSGE with a financial accelerator
mechanism to those estimated from data in response to a monetary policy shock. Us-
ing the estimated parameters, they find that their model is capable of reproducing the
shape and magnitude of the empirical impulse responses.
Although the estimated parameterisation of their model implies an important role for
nominal price and wage rigidities as well as capital adjustment costs, the estimate for the
parameter governing the financial accelerator mechanism is not statistically significant.
This suggests that the financial accelerator does not improve the empirical performance
of DSGE models in response to monetary policy shocks and, as such, may be of limited
relevance.
Conversely, Christensen and Dib (2008a) find that the inclusion of a financial accelerator
mechanism improves the empirical fit of output and investment volatilities in a model
with a modified Taylor rule. In particular, they note the importance of the financial
accelerator for spreading of investment shocks to the wider economy.
From these studies, there is evidence that inclusion of a financial accelerator can im-
prove empirical fit in DSGE models in some cases. However, its significance in the
model will depend on the monetary policy rule used and the source of the shock under
consideration, among other characteristics.
Models containing an external finance premium also have other limitations that should
be noted. First, they are not capable of generating the asymmetric dynamics observed
in the data where the premium rises much faster in response to deteriorating credit
quality, as model implied premia are normally assumed to rise and fall linearly. In
addition, they typically do not take account of expectations of future asset prices in
determining the current level of the premium, as the premium is derived only from the
current net worth of the entrepreneurs.
14 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Furthermore, models with a financial accelerator are not apt to capture increased
bankruptcy rates during economic downturns due to the assumption of a constant
probability of bankruptcy. For these reasons, models that incorporate an external fi-
nance premium are best suited to evaluating business cycle dynamics during normal
times rather than for hypothesising the likely consequences of severe financial distress.
2.4.2 The Collateral Constraint Channel
The inability of the external finance premium to capture asymmetric credit dynamics
is remedied in the collateral constraint literature. Unlike in models containing an ex-
ternal finance premium where the supply of funds is only limited by the price of credit,
agents facing a collateral constraint are directly limited in the amount they can bor-
row. Typically, models specify an exogenous or endogenous constraint on the amount
an agent can borrow to a certain percentage of their underlying assets that are offered
as collateral for the loan. As such, this methodology limits the availability of funding
to borrowers in the model.
In collateral based models, in the event of the borrower’s bankruptcy, the underlying
assets (or collateral) used to secure the loan are transferred to the creditor. It follows
that creditors can only recover the nominal value of the assets used to secure the loan in
the event of default. As a result, creditors in these models are very sensitive to changes
in the underlying value of collateral. It is this feature that makes these models better
able to capture the observed asymmetry in the propagation of negative financial shocks
in the economy.
Following Brazdik et al. (2012), consider a firm that allocates its resources optimally
between financial capital (deposits at the bank) and productive capital (machinery).
Assume this firm has no access to external funding. In response to a temporary income
shock, the firm will either choose to consume the additional revenue or increase its
financial capital (as it is assumed to have already optimised its production factors).
Suppose now that the firm faces a negative income shock. If the shock is small enough,
the firm will absorb the shock by reducing its expenditure or the amount of financial
capital it holds, or both. However, if the shock is too large to be absorbed by the firm’s
liquid resources, it will have to reduce its productive capital as well, which will affect
its output in future periods.
In contrast, where the firm has the option of borrowing outside financial capital, it will
prefer to use external funding in order to absorb the shock and will gradually return to
the optimal debt allocation over time. However, with a collateral constraint, the firm’s
ability to obtain external financing will be limited by its underlying assets.
It is this limitation that allows for the asymmetric impact of shocks: even with the
option of obtaining external finance, a sufficiently large negative shock could exhaust
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a firm’s financing options. This forces the firm to reduce its productive capital, which
results in a real economic contraction. In this way, limiting external financing through
a collateral constraint allows for the asymmetric propagation of shocks.
The collateral constraint literature developed from Hart and Moore (1994). That paper
introduced a model of external funding where there is a risk that the project will be
unsuccessful in which case the debtor will not be able to repay the loan. This leads the
lender to impose an upper limit on the amount of credit made available to the borrower,
with the limit depending positively on the assets the borrower can use to secure the
loan.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) expanded the literature by introducing a model that in-
cluded both patient and impatient firms, with the latter facing credit constraints on
the amount they could borrow to finance expenditure. These credit constraints limit
the amount the impatient firm could borrow to the value of their durable assets, which
are also used as factors in production. It follows that changing underlying collateral
values amplifies and propagates shocks through the economy as falling collateral values
limit firms’ ability to borrow and invest in both current and future periods.
Similarly to the external finance premium literature, the finding that collateral con-
straints have important amplification effects on the business cycle has been doubted.
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) show that the financial accelerator effect observed in Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997) was driven by two key assumptions: the risk neutrality of
investors and constant returns to scale in production.
With more realistic assumptions of risk-averse lenders and decreasing returns to scale in
production, Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) find that credit constraints only have a small am-
plification impact on responses in the model. Through simulations they conclude that
most parameterisations will produce some amplification compared to perfect-markets
models, but that a large amplification from the financial accelerator effect can only be
achieved with few combinations of parameters.
Similarly, Kocherlakota (2000) finds that the amplification effect of collateral constraints
is sensitive to the quantitative specification of the underlying economy, especially factor
shares.
Like Christensen et al. (2011) for the external finance premium literature, Iacoviello
(2005) was sceptical of the use of real contracts in the collateral constraint literature.
To explore the impact of nominal contracts, he included nominal debt in a DSGE with
housing as collateral. In this model, there is a financial accelerator response to positive
demand shocks where increased asset prices buoy borrowing and consumption. This
mirrors the observed empirical relationship between house prices and consumption.
However, the model also shows that there is a decelerator mechanism in response to
an adverse supply shocks, as increased inflationary pressure decreases the real value
of obligations, improving borrowers’ net worth and minimising the resulting economic
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contraction. Finally, he notes that including asset prices in the central bank’s policy
rule has a negligible impact on the variation of output and inflation in the model.
Although Iacoviello (2005) was capable of matching empirical responses on the demand
side of the housing market, the model assumed a fixed supply of housing that limited the
supply side analysis that could be performed. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) developed this
model by incorporating a heterogeneous supply side that allows business investment,
consumption and housing to be produced from capital, labour and land, the latter of
which is only used for housing production. As expected, this creates a trade-off between
business investment and housing in the model that allows for endogenous dynamics
between house prices, business investment, and consumption.
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) find that housing demand shocks and housing technology
shocks together explain roughly half of the cyclical variation in housing investment and
house prices. Monetary policy shocks contribute between 15-20 percent of the volatility.
Based on this result, it is arguable that macroprudential tools may be effective to the
extent that they reduce cyclical demand for housing, but nevertheless monetary policy
remains a strong cyclical driver of house prices. Crucially, they find that specifying a
collateral constraint on household borrowing amplifies the impact of housing demand
and interest rate shocks on consumption.
Given the importance of the housing market to the persistent depression following the
GFC , Liu et al. (2010) were puzzled by the earlier finding of Kocherlakota (2000)
and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) that credit constraints only have a muted impact on
the transmission of shocks. Using a model in which entrepreneurs can use both land
and capital as collateral, as well as being used as inputs in production, they show that
credit constraints can substantially amplify and propagate macroeconomic fluctuations.
However, this model does not address supply side dynamics as housing supply is fixed
in the model.
2.5 Financial intermediation
Another key area for development of financial frictions in DSGE models has been
through the inclusion of a banking sector in these models. This allows the modeller
to examine the role of banks in the financial market, especially to understand: the
wedge between interbank lending rates and the risk-free rate; the role of bank capital
in business cycle fluctuations; and the propagation of systemic risk.
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) pioneered a model that incorporated a banking sec-
tor with multiple types of interest rates and a financial accelerator mechanism as in
Bernanke et al. (1999). This model shows that use of a single interest rate in a DSGE
model may cause the central bank to miss appropriate policy settings by up to 4% per
annum.
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Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) also note the two conflicting impacts of the inclu-
sion of a banking sector on the financial accelerator mechanism. First, the spread
between the risk-free rate and the loan rate increases procyclically, so the external fi-
nance premium grows in booms and drops in recessions. This attenuates the impact
of a monetary policy shock, as it reduces demand for loans in a boom, which limits
consumption growth.
At the same time, the increased loan servicing cost raises the opportunity cost of invest-
ment. This causes the price of capital to increase, in turn raising the collateral value
of capital, implicitly decreasing the monitoring costs and amplifying the impact of the
monetary policy shock. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) conclude that for reasonable
parameterisations, the attenuating impact will dominate the amplification effect of the
financial accelerator for a monetary policy shock.
In a series of papers, Curdia and Woodford developed a model with a stylised banking
sector and heterogenous agents that can change type. This allowed them to consider
whether the incorporation of credit spreads changes the impact of different monetary
policy rules. In their first paper, Curdia and Woodford (2009) incorporate a credit
spread that can vary both endogenously and exogenously in the model. They find
that the existence of positive spread in the model does not significantly alter the ef-
fects of different monetary policy settings, but that variations in this spread over time
have implications for the relationship between real activity and inflation. Nevertheless,
they conclude that inclusion of a credit spread does not significantly change optimal
monetary policy in this model.
In the second paper, Curdia and Woodford (2010) extend the analysis to consider
whether including a measure of financial conditions in the standard Taylor rule im-
proves the central bank’s response to various disturbances. Although they find that an
adjustment for variations in the credit spread can improve the performance of a Taylor
rule, the optimal size of adjustment depends on the source of the shock. As such, it is
difficult to prespecify an adjustment that would invariably improve on the performance
of a standard Taylor rule.
Christiano et al. (2011) incorporate a banking sector into an estimated standard New
Keynesian open economy model of the type proposed by Adolfson et al. (2007). In
this model, they find that financial shocks are important drivers of fluctuations in
investment and GDP. Additionally, they note that the model with financial frictions
has better forecasting performance for CPI and the interest rate than other versions of
the model that do not include financial frictions.
Although it has rich labour market dynamics, the banking sector in Christiano et al.
(2011)’s model is still relatively simple. In order to explore the impact of competi-
tion and endogenous capital on the transmission, Gerali et al. (2010) extend Iacoviello
(2005)’s model to include a monopolistically competitive banking sector. They find
that sticky loan and deposit rates attenuate the impact of a monetary policy shock,
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while incorporating financial intermediaries amplifies the propagation of supply shocks
in the model. They conclude that shocks originating in the banking sector explain the
largest share of the contraction in economic activity that occurred during the GFC in
2008, with a far smaller share being ascribed to macroeconomic shocks.
Dib (2010) synthesised much of this earlier work by incorporating two different types
of banks and endogenous default in a DSGE model. In his paper, one of the banks
is given a portfolio choice between investing in government bonds or in the interbank
market. As it is costly for banks to raise capital to satisfy the regulatory requirements,
he finds that the inclusion of a banking sector dampens the impact of financial shocks
on the real economy. This in turn reduces macroeconomic volatility. Consistent with
the results of previous studies, he finds that inclusion of a financial sector amplifies the
impact of supply side shocks but attenuates the propagation of demand side shocks to
real variables.
Note that where the primary objective of the external finance premium and collateral
constraint literature was to explain observed fluctuations in output, the financial inter-
mediation literature has developed primarily to help explain financial crises. But, as
noted above, inclusion of a financial sector has important implications for the transmis-
sion of shocks to the real economy, especially when focussing on crisis periods. Given
the focus of this thesis is the business cycle implications of LVR restrictions during nor-
mal times, I have decided to not include a banking sector for parsimony. Nevertheless,
the inclusion of a banking sector into the model could be an area of future research.
Chapter 3
BVAR Evidence of House Prices
and the Business Cycle
Figure 3.1 presents the impulse responses (standardised with one standard deviation
confidence bands) from a structural vector autoregression model estimated using Bayesian
techniques (BVAR) containing key business cycle variables in New Zealand. The model
is estimated using a loose Litterman prior. It includes change in the output gap, change
in headline inflation, change in detrended real house prices, and the overnight cash rate
from the first quarter of 1993 to the last quarter of 2015. This period was selected as it
represents the time of low and stable inflation following changes to the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand Act in 1989.
Following the approach by Sims (1980) and others, the shocks are orthogonalised using
a Choleski decomposition, with the ordering given by [R,∆π,∆q,∆Y ]. This ordering
can be motivated both by Granger causality tests and consistency with the model. In
particular, note that these variables are ordered from most exogenous to the least. The
interest rate is directly influenced by the central bank so is exogenously controlled by
a central authority, while output is a result of all agents acting in the economy. Note
that responses are robust to alternative orderings of the variables
Confidence intervals have been generated using Monte Carlo techniques to resample the
data 10,000 times.
From this analysis we can make several observations about the business cycle that we
should capture in a model.
(a) First, a model should deliver a negative response of real house prices and output to
tight monetary policy (Figure 3.1). Note that although we would also expect prices
to fall in response to a positive shock to the interest rate, this is not captured in
the VAR, likely due to the lagged response of inflation to monetary policy.
(b) Second, the model should capture a negative response in real house prices and
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output to a positive inflation disturbance (Figure 3.1, second column).
(c) Third, there should be a significant positive response of output to a house price
shock (Figure 3.1, third column). Note that we would also expect house prices
to rise in response to a demand shock. Theory suggests that when output rises,
households become wealthier and spend more on housing as a result, but this impact
is not clear in the data. This is likely due to the endogeneity in the data.
When output rises, interest rates would also be expected to rise, which would
increase the cost of borrowing and may depress housing demand and prices. These
offsetting impacts on house prices mean that the channel from increased demand to
house prices is less well defined in the data than we would expect. Nevertheless, we
expect the model to capture a two-way positive interaction between house prices
and output, as in Iacoviello (2005).
Note the persistence of the interest rate response to a house price shock (top row,
third column). There is a strong wealth effect in New Zealand data, with high house
prices encouraging greater consumption in the economy. This effect is likely driving the
interest rate response in this VAR, as output is likewise high over this period.
Given the strength and persistence of the interest rate response relative to the output
and inflation response, it is arguable that a macroprudential tool that acted to moder-
ate house prices would diminish the on-going pressure on the interest rate. However,
separate macroprudential intervention would only be necessary where there was a mis-
alignment between the strength of the economy and the strength of the housing market.
This matter will be discussed in further detail below.
The rest of this paper develops a model based on Iacoviello (2005) that is consistent with
these business cycle facts, but that can be used for policy analysis of the implications
of LVR restrictions on the business cycle and for the transmission of monetary policy.
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Figure 3.1: BVAR evidence from New Zealand
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Chapter 4
Model Description
The model developed in this paper is a standard New Keynesian DSGE model with a
sophisticated housing sector and collateral constraints. It is intended as a tool to assist
in the discussion of the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies in
New Zealand.
There are two types of households: patient (denoted with a superscript ‘P’) and im-
patient (denoted with a superscript ‘I’), each with unit mass. The difference between
patient and impatient households is the discount factor that is applied to their utility.
Patient households have a higher discount factor than impatient households (βP > βI)
so impatient households value consumption relatively more today than in the future.
As a result, patient households act as savers in the model while impatient households
are borrowers.
Figure 4.1 depicts the model framework. The components in blue are consistent with
Iacoviello (2005)’s original framework while those in pink are the new components that
have been added to the model. Red arrows indicate the transfer of stocks in the model
while blue arrows indicate real prices for these components.
This model differs from Iacoviello (2005) as entrepreneur’s functions have been trans-
ferred into two different agents in the model: intermediate goods producers and in-
vestors. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods pro-
ducers that produce differentiated goods. Their inputs in production are labour from
patient and impatient households and capital, which is hired from investors each period
at the rate of rkt .
Unlike in Iacoviello (2005), housing is not an input in production of the final good in
the economy, so housing has no productive use in the economy. Rather, investors have
the option of making housing available to patient and impatient households as rental
accommodation at the rate qrt .
Intermediate goods firms are subject to Calvo-pricing such that each firm is only able
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to update its price in a given period with a probability (1−θ), which generates nominal
price rigidities in the economy. There is also a perfectly competitive final goods producer
that aggregates the goods from intermediate goods producers and sells them to patient
households, impatient households and investors at a price Pt.
Investors are distinct from patient and impatient households as housing is not in their
utility function. Rather, investors obtain utility solely from consumption, which they
seek to maximise by investing in housing and capital. As noted above, the return on
housing is the rent qrt , which is the rate that patient and impatient households pay
to rent the accommodation. Similarly, the return on capital is rkt , which is the rental
price that intermediate goods producers pay to use capital in production. Investors also
benefit from any increase in the price of houses or capital from one period to the next
(i.e. capital gains). Investors have a discount rate (γ) that sits between that of patient
and impatient households in the economy, with the result that they are net borrowers
in the model (βP > γ > βI).
Capital is produced by a capital goods producer that takes the undepreciated portion
of capital from investors and combines it with the final good to produce the new capital
stock in the economy. This capital stock is sold back to investors for a price of qkt . Note
that this process does not directly require labour inputs, which simplifies the analysis.
Housing is likewise produced by a separate housing producer that combines the existing
undepreciated housing stock with the final good to produce the current period’s housing
stock. This housing stock is sold back to patient households, impatient households and
investors at a price of qht . Again, the production of housing does not directly require
labour as an input.
Both impatient households and investors are subject to a borrowing constraint that
limits the amount that they can borrow in the current period to a fraction, mI and mE
respectively, of the expected value of their housing the following period. These loan-to-
value ratios are exogenously set by the central bank in this model. This specification
allows us to run policy experiments that test the impact of different levels of LVR
restriction on the transmission of shocks within the model.
The central bank in the model follows a Taylor rule with smoothing that aims to min-
imise the variation in output and inflation. Following the rule as specified in Iacoviello
(2005), the central bank only responds to lagged inflation and lagged output rather
than to these variables contemporaneously. This is consistent with central bank prac-
tice where data is released with a lag so the only available data for the central bank to
use (other than estimates based on component results) is lagged results.
A full description of the technical components of this model follows in the next section.
4.1. DESCRIPTION OF AGENTS IN THE MODEL 25










































4.1 Description of agents in the model
4.1.1 Patient Households
Patient households gain utility from consumption cPt , housing h
P
t , and lose utility from

























where βP is the rate at which patient households discount future utility.
Patient households have the option of consuming housing either through ownership hPo,t
or by renting housing hPr,t from period to period. Ownership comes at the nominal cost
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of Qht while rental is available at the nominal cost of Q
r
t . The utility provided from


















where vP measures the elasticity of substitution between rental and home ownership and
ωP measures the share of each type of housing that they consume. Their consumption
of housing is also subject to an exogenous preference shock jPt and depreciation of δh
per period.
Patient households earn income through wages (wPt ), lending money to impatient house-
holds and entrepreneurs (bPt ) and through their ownership of the intermediate goods
producers. The intermediate goods producers rebate their profits to the patient house-
hold in full as Ft.
Patient households face a budget constraint that limits their amount of spending on
consumption, housing and deposits (bPt ) to their income in the current period. This














t + Ft (4.3)
Patient households also face an adjustment cost associated with changing the amount
of housing they use each period. To reflect the differences in costs associated with
home ownership (for example, solicitor’s fees and building inspections) we assume the
cost is only incurred for changing the amount of home ownership. The adjustment cost











where φPo is the parameter that governs the adjustment costs.
Given the budget constraint and adjustment costs specified above, we can write the



























t − bPt − wPt LPt
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(4.5)
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Differentiating with respect to the patient households’ choice variables (consumption,




































































































Similar to patient households, impatient households choose consumption (cIt ), borrowing
(bIt ), housing (h
I
t ), and labour supply (L
I
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We assume that the the impatient households have a lower discount factor on future
utility than patient households (giving rise to the description ’impatient’) so βI < βP .
Impatient households have the option of consuming housing either through ownership
or by renting housing from period to period. Ownership comes at the nominal cost of
Qht while rental is available at the nominal cost of Q
r
t . The utility provided from each


















where vI measures the elasticity of substitution between rental and home ownership and
ωI measures the share of each type of housing that they consume. Their consumption
of housing is also subject to an exogenous preference shock jIt and depreciation of δh
per period.
Borrowing (bIt ) is available from the patient household at the central bank specified
nominal rate of Rt. Impatient households earn income each period through labour
supply (at wage wIt ) and borrowing, which they use to pay for consumption, housing
and to repay previous period’s borrowing. Dividing the nominal prices by the price















Impatient households are also subject to a borrowing constraint that limits the amount




t ≤ EtmIqht+1(1− δh)hIo,tπt+1 (4.14)
This proportion (mI) of the expected value of the housing is the loan-to-value (LVR)
restriction in the model. It is exogenously fixed so that we may conduct policy experi-
ments by varying the level of this restriction.
It follows that in addition to the utility that house ownership provides, house owner-
ship also allows the impatient household to borrow more as the collateral constraint
is relaxed. As with patient households, impatient households face an adjustment cost
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By writing the budget constraint in terms of consumption, then substituting this defi-
nition into the objective function, the maximisation problem for impatient households


















































The first order conditions with respect to the impatient household’s choice variables

































































This means that when the impatient household buys housing hIo,t, the cost is q
h
t plus
the adjustment cost associated with changing its level of housing use from the previous
period. The benefits of acquiring housing in the current period include any capital gain
the impatient household attains on the property, possibly avoiding higher adjustment
costs in the future, and the increased collateral value of the underlying housing (that
























ηI−1 ≡ wIt = (LIt )η
I−1cIt (4.20)
4.1.3 Investors
Investors aim to maximise their consumption by investing in houses, making houses
available for rental to patient and impatient households, and by renting capital to the
intermediate goods producer. Note that investors are different from impatient and pa-
tient households as they only have consumption in their utility function. They therefore
treat houses as a financial investment for which the return is the rent received in one
period and the expected capital gain. This specification likely captures the motives of
housing investors in the New Zealand market as distinct from owner-occupiers per the
LVR policy.
There is an argument that there is not a clear real world analogue to investors in the
model as this specification implies that investors do not work. However, with a growing
proportion of retirees and overseas investors in New Zealand, both groups of which are
active in the housing market, it is fair to assume there are some ‘investors’ active in
the economy that do not supply labour.





where Ar is a parameter that acts as a proxy for the efficiency of the rental market as
in Ortega et al. (2011). This parameter covers things such as risk of vacancy, damage,
enforceability of contracts, etc. Rental accommodation is made available to households





). It follows that in order to close
the rental market it must be the case that the housing made available for rental by the







Investors also own all of the capital Kt in the economy, which they rent to intermediate
goods producers at the rate of rkt . Similar to housing, capital depreciates each period
at the rate of δk. As with impatient households, investors may borrow from patient
households at the nominal rate Rt that is set by the central bank.
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γt ln cEt (4.22)
where γ is the discount rate that applies to investors’ utility. Consistent with Iacoviello
(2005), this parameter is calibrated to sit between the respective discount rates of
patient and impatient households.
This maximisation problem is subject to a budget constraint. Investors’ costs include
consumption, housing, and inflation-adjusted repayment of borrowing from the previous
period (Rt−1
πt
bEt−1). The budget constraint states that these costs must be equal to the
entrepreneur’s revenue from housing and capital rental in that period (stated in terms


























where δk and δh are the depreciation rates of capital and housing respectively. As with
patient and impatient households, investors also face adjustment costs for changing the












where φE is the parameter that governs the level of the adjustment costs.
Finally, as with impatient households, entrepreneurs are subject to a borrowing con-
straint that restricts their level of borrowing to a certain proportion of the expected




t ≤ mEqht+1(1− δh)hEt πt+1 (4.25)
Borrowing is pre-multiplied by the interest rate as the total amount due to the lender
in the following period will be the amount borrowed multiplied by the interest rate.
This borrowing constraint, mE, is the investor LVR restriction in the model that is
exogenously specified so that we may conduct policy scenarios within the model.
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Note that allowing investors to choose between capital and housing investment has
important implications for the transmission of shocks in the model. In particular, where
there is a shock that causes house prices and rental yield to rise, housing investment
will increase and capital investment will fall.
Empirical findings suggest that housing and capital investment have a positive correla-
tion (see Davis and Heathcote (2005) and Leung (2004)), but the negative correlation
generated in this model is a key assumption for capturing the trade off between housing
investment and capital investment. With the demographic of asset-rich retirees grow-
ing in New Zealand, it is interesting to model how their choices between interesting in
housing as a financial asset and investing in capital would affect output and inflation.
There has long been a school of thought that housing is a non-productive resource
and that the cost of excess investment in housing is lack of growth in other sectors
(Burns and Grebler (1976)). This could cause inflation, exert pressure on the balance
of payments as resources were diverted away from export sectors, and tie up resources
for a long period of time given housing’s very high capital to output ratio (Harris and
Gillies (1963)).
Business cycle models have historically treated business capital and housing investment
as perfect subsitutes (Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Christiano (1988)) such that
the allocation between the two is indeterminate in the model. However, when the two
types of capital are disentangled, Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) observe a negative
comovement between housing and business investment in response to a productivity
shock.
In addition, the differential tax treatment of housing favours the accumulation of hous-
ing capital at the expense of business capital (see Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991)).
In New Zealand, Henry (1982) argued that the differential tax treatment of housing has
diverted resources away from productive sectors.
Figure 4.2 shows how this model captures the trade off between housing investment and
capital investment at different levels of investor-specific LVR restrictions. In particular,
it shows while the volatility of housing investment is decreasing with reduced LVR
restrictions, the volatility of capital investment is minimised at an LVR of 78%. This
result is intuitive. As the investor LVR restriction decreases, investors must retain more
of their housing stock in order to retain a given level of borrowing. This decreases the
volatility of demand for housing and volatility of housing investment accordingly.
Simultaneously, as the investor divests (or acquires) less housing in response to shocks
due to the borrowing constraint, they likewise acquire (or divest) less of the consump-
tion good in response to the same shock. This means that a falling LVR constraint
also reduces the volatility of demand for the output good, and accordingly capital in-
vestment. This impact is minimised at an investor LVR of 78%. Beyond that point,
the LVR restriction binds the investor’s behaviour regarding housing and borrowing so
tightly that much of the impact of the shock needs to be absorbed by the investor’s
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consumption. This increases the volatility of the investor’s demand for the output good.
This seems to imply that a LVR greater than 78% is undesirable as it increases both
housing and capital investment volatility all things equal.
Figure 4.2: Comparison of volatility of capital and housing investment at different
investor-specific LVRs
By solving the budget constraint for consumption, we can summarise the utility max-






































t − Et(mE(1− δk)qt+1hEt πt+1)
)]
(4.26)
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The first order conditions with respect to the entrepreneurs’ choice variables of borrow-
























































This means that when the investor buys housing hEt , the cost is q
h
t plus the adjustment
cost associated with changing its level of housing use from the previous period. The
benefits of acquiring housing in the current period include the rental value of housing,
any capital gain attained on the property, avoidance of higher adjustment costs in the
future, and the increased collateral value of the underlying housing that relaxes the


















4.1.4 Final Goods Producers
The final goods sector aggregates the output of the intermediate goods producers, Yt(j)










where εp > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the different types of goods.
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The final goods producer seeks to maximise its profits from the sale of Yt by minimising
the expenditure on inputs Pt(j) from the intermediate goods producers given the pro-

















The optimal choice of inputs Yt(j) is given by the first order condition:
∂L
∂Yt(j)





























































As there is constant returns to scale, Pt represents the minimum cost of producing one
unit of the final good regardless of the total quantity produced. This allows Pt to be
interpreted as the aggregate price index.
4.1.5 Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms that produce the intermedi-
ate goods. These firms are owned by the patient households and all profits are rebated
lump sum as Ft.
These intermediate goods producers use labour from patient households, labour from
impatient households, and capital to produce a differentiated final output, Yt(j) that
they sell to the final goods producer at price Pt(j).
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where At is an AR(1) technology shock.








where εp is the degree of substitution between the different types of goods in the market.
Therefore each intermediate good producer seeks to minimise the cost of their inputs











t (j) + r
k
tKt(j) (4.38)










Substituting in the demand function from above, we can therefore set up the interme-


















where the Lagrangian multiplier RMCt is the real marginal cost of producing an addi-
tional good.
Differentiating with respect to the choice variables of capital, labour from patient house-
holds and labour from impatient households we have:









For labour supplied by patient households:
∂L
∂LPt (j)
= 0⇔ −wPt +RMCt
(
AtKt(j)








For labour supplied by impatient households is:
∂L
∂LIt (j)












Note that as intermediate firms face the same factor prices, they will hire capital and
labour in the same ratios, which will in turn be equal to the aggregate ratios. Therefore
we can drop the j that differentiates the different firms in production. The Lagrangian






[µ]µ[(1− α)(1− µ)](1−α)(1−µ)[α(1− µ)]α(1−µ)
(4.47)
The real profit flow to each firm j can be written as the amount of output it produces
multiplied by the price it charges, minus the marginal cost per unit multiplied by the
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We assume that intermediate goods producers are subject to Calvo (1983) pricing such
that only a fraction (1 − θ) of intermediate goods firms can adjust their prices each
period. It follows that there is a probability θ that a firm will be stuck with its previous
price for one period. As such, the average price level in the economy will be an aggregate





t−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−εp (4.49)
where Pt−1 is the price from the previous period and P
∗
t is the average price charged
by firms that reset their prices in that period.








for any period s ≥ 0 for which the firm will retain the same price. With this demand













where ∆t,s is the patient households stochastic discount factor given by: ∆t,s =
u′(cPt )
u′(cPt+s)















Therefore all updating firms in a given period will update to the same price so that
P ∗t (j) = P
∗
t .
Define the steady state mark-up as X = εp













Substituting in the definition of Y ∗t+s from above, this can be written as:
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If θ = 0 then the equation for the optimal price reduces to P ∗t =
εp
εp−1RMCtPt. That
is, if firms are able to update their prices every period then the the optimal real price
would be a fixed mark up εp
εp−1 over nominal marginal cost.
The above first order condition can be log-linearised as (for details, see technical ap-
pendix):
πt = β
pEt ˆπt+1 + κ ˆRMCt (4.55)





Similar to Alpanda et al. (2014) and Jacob et al. (2014), capital producers combine
the stock of capital from the previous period with capital investment goods to produce
capital. Capital producers purchase the capital investment good (Ikt ) from final goods
producer at the price of Pt after final goods production has taken place. They com-
bine this with the undepreciated capital (Kt−1) from investors that they purchase at
the relative price of qkt to produce the capital stock for the next period. This allows
production to be described by the following law of motion:











where κk is the parameter governing the adjustment costs that apply to changing the
level of capital investment from period to period. Zkt is an investment-specific techno-
logical change shock which is assumed to be exogenous and follow an AR(1) process.
Following production, the capital producer sells its capital stock back to investors at



























Differentiating with respect to the choice variable of capital investment we have:
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∂
∂Ikt


































Log-linearising this expression we obtain:
Îkt =
1





(1 + βP )
ˆIkt−1 +
βP




Housing producers function in a similar way to the capital goods producers. At the end
of the period they purchase the existing housing stock off patient households, impatient
households and investors at the market price qht . They combine this housing stock with
the housing investment good (Iht ) to produce the final stock of housing for that period.
As with the capital investment good, the housing investment good is purchased from
the final goods producer at the price Pt.
Therefore, the evolution of the housing stock can be described by the following law of
motion:











where κh is the parameter that governs the adjustment costs associated with changing
the investment in housing. Zht is an exogenous housing-investment-specific shock that
is assumed to follow an AR(1) process.
Following production, the housing producer sells the newly produced and existing hous-
ing stock back to the patient households, impatient households and investor at the real
price of qht . Therefore, analogously to the capital producer, the profit maximisation



























The first order condition with respect to the investment in housing is:
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ˆIht−1 +
βP
(1 + βP )
Et
ˆIht+1 (4.63)
4.1.8 The Central Bank
The central bank sets monetary policy in the model according to a Taylor rule so that
the nominal interest rate responds to lagged inflation, lagged output and its own lag. It
is also subject to a monetary policy shock εr. The log-linearised monetary policy rule
is therefore:
R̂t = (1− rr)(1 + rπ) ˆπt−1 + ry(1− rr) ˆYt−1 + rr ˆRt−1 + εr (4.64)
where rr measures the degree of interest rate smoothing, rπ is the weight on lagged
inflation, and ry is the weight on lagged output.
4.1.9 Market clearing conditions and equilibrium
In order to close the model, it must be the case that consumption and investment equal
output in a given period. Therefore, aggregate output must equal the sum of all agents’












The housing market clears if two conditions are satified. First, it needs to be the case
that the housing stock in the current period equals the housing stock from the previous







t − (1− δh)hPo,t−1 − (1− δh)hIo,t−1 − (1− δh)hEt−1 (4.66)
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Second, for the rental market to clear, it must also be the case that the total rental made









All saving in the model is provided by patient households who lend money to the
impatient households and investors at the risk free rate. Therefore, in order for the
financial sector to clear, savings from patient households must equal borrowing from
impatient households and investors.





Finally, two of the agents’ flow of funds constraints must be satisfied as, per Walrus’
law, satisfying two is sufficient to satisfy the third.









































Intermediate goods producers profits are rebated in lump sum to patient households so









I have calibrated a subset of the parameters in the model in order to match a number
of key ratios in the New Zealand economy, mostly based on data available in the 2013
New Zealand census.
The parameter that governs the efficiency of the rental market, Ar, has been selected








matches that observed in the New Zealand economy. The data used to calculate this
ratio is annual average rental payments divided by the average value of house prices.
The weights of housing ownership for patient and impatient households, ωP and ωI
respectively, are likewise selected to match New Zealand data.
Similarly, the elasticities of substitution between home and rental accommodation for
patient and impatient households, vP = 1.45 and vI = 1.40, have been calibrated
so consumption of ownership and housing rental match proportions observed in the
economy. The share of housing with a mortgage in the model also closely matches that
observed in New Zealand data (see Table 5.1).
The calibration selected also yields ratios of residential investment to GDP, business
investment to GDP, and consumption to GDP that closely match those observed in
the domestic economy. For the purposes of calculating these ratios, I have included
government expenditure with consumption due to its aggregate demand impact on the
economy. Excluding government expenditure only slightly modifies the distribution
between these different components in the New Zealand economy.
A summary of these key steady state ratios in the model compared to New Zealand
data is provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Comparison of key steady state values to New Zealand data
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Data Model Data Sources
Rent over house price, q̄
r
q̄h
0.009333 0.009333 New Zealand Census 2013




41.38% 46.6% New Zealand Census 2013
Share of housing with mortgage, h̄
I
h
0.5407 0.5531 New Zealand Census 2013
Residential investment to GDP 4.48 % 6.20 % New Zealand GDP 2016
Capital investment to GDP 17.58 % 18.75% New Zealand GDP 2016
Consumption to GDP 76.17% 76.77% New Zealand GDP 2016
Other parameters are set according to the literature. A complete list of parameter
values is given in Table 5.2.
The discount factor for patient households is set to a level that corresponds to an
annual interest rate of 4% in steady state. This is close to the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand’s assumption for the neutral rate, which is currently set at 4.25% (Richardson
and Williams (2015)). Consistent with Iacoviello (2005) and the related housing DSGE
literature, the discount factor for impatient households is set at a lower level, with the
discount factor for housing investors sitting between the two.
The labour supply aversion, η, and the capital depreciation δk is set following Iacoviello
(2005). Housing depreciation is then set to match capital depreciation so there is no
bias toward one or the other due to relative depreciation weights. The variable capital
share, µ, is set equal to 0.3, which implies a 70% income share of labour. The wage
share of patient households is set equal to 64%.
Firms are assumed to be able to change prices every four quarters on average, which
implies a probability of 0.75. The steady state mark up for firms is set at 1.05, consistent
with Iacoviello (2005).
The parameters of the Taylor Rule are set to 0.82 for the lagged interest rate, 1.90
for response to inflation and 0.32 for response to output, consistent with Jacob et al.
(2014)’s estimated model of the New Zealand economy. These parameters are higher
than those found from non-linear regressions of the New Zealand economy (Kendall
and Ng (2013)), which is likely due to the period of price stability in the sample used
in that study.
A long period of price stability would have anchored expectations so that the real
interest rate would be less affected by contemporaneous changes to the inflation rate.
As a result of this, the nominal interest rate response to inflation required to generate a
given response in the real interest rate may be lower than in the pre-inflation targeting
period.
However, to impose these parameters upon a DSGE model may not accurately reflect
how the central bank responds to agents in a model context, so I have chosen to use
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those estimated within Jacob et al. (2014)’s model instead. It is of note that the
calibration selected is similar to that proposed by Taylor (1993).
The LVR parameters for impatient households, mI , and investors, mE, are modified per
the scenarios described in the policy analysis section below. Three different calibrations
are used
(a) No LVR restriction scenario: mI = mE = 95%
(b) Impatient household LVR restriction scenario: mI = 80% and mE = 95%
(c) Investor specific LVR restriction and impatient household LVR restriction: mI =
80% and mE = 70%
These scenarios have been selected as they correspond to the levels of the LVR re-
strictions that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand implemented in New Zealand in 2013
and 2015. More generally, these scenarios allow consideration of how varying the LVR
restrictions imposed on different agents affects agents’ trade offs and business cycle
dynamics. A complete analysis of different parameterisations of these LVR restrictions
(and their interactions) is available in the appendix.
Table 5.2: Calibration of parameter values
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Parameter Symbol Value
Preferences: Discount factors
Patient households discount factor βP 0.99
Impatient households discount factor βI 0.95
Investors discount factor γ 0.98
Other preference parameters
Labour supply aversion η 1.01
Weight on housing services j 0.1
Ownership/rental preferences
Weight on housing ownership for patient households ωP 0.71
Weight on housing ownership for impatient households ωI 0.71
Elasticity of substitution between home ownership and rental for patient households vP 1.45
Elasticity of substitution between home ownership and rental for impatient households vI 1.4
Technology: Factors productivity µ 0.3
Variable capital share α 0.64
Share of patient labour
Depreciation δh 0.03
Housing depreciation δk 0.03
Capital depreciation
Adjustment costs
Housing adjustment cost φh 1
Capital adjustment cost ψk 1
Housing producers adjustment cost κh 1
Capital producers adjustment cost κk 1
Efficiency of conversion to rental property Ar 0.56
Sticky prices
Probability of fixed price θ 0.75
Steady-state gross markup X 1.05
Monetary policy
Interest rate smoothing rr 0.73
Weight on lagged inflation rπ 0.27
Weight on lagged output rY 0.13
Shocks
Monetary policy shock εr N(0, 0.0841)
Housing preference shock εj N(0, 619.51)
Technology shock εA N(0, 5.018)
Cost-push shock εu N(0, 0.0289)
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5.1 Comparison to Iacoviello (2005)
For robustness, it is useful to compare the impulse responses from Iacoviello (2005)
to see that the modifications made to the model have not fundamentally altered the
business cycle properties of that model. This comparison is provided in the appendix.
5.2 Comparison to the VAR analysis
The calibration provided in the above section can be compared to the VAR that we
estimated based on New Zealand data. A comparison of the impulse responses from
the model to the SVAR with one standard deviation confidence bands is shown in
Figure 5.1.
From this chart, it is clear that the model replicates many of the responses observed in
the data:
(a) Figure 5.1 shows that in response to a monetary policy shock, output and house
prices fall, though to a greater magnitude than what is predicted by the data.
Inflation in the model also falls in response to a monetary policy shock. This is
inconsistent with the data but likely reflects that the VAR specification does not
capture the length of time monetary policy takes to affect inflation.
(b) A cost-push shock has a positive impact on interest rates and a negative impact on
house prices and output in the model (Figure 5.1, second column). The negative
effect on house prices and output captures the dynamics observed in the data well,
but again due to lags in monetary policy, the response of the interest rate in the
data is not well defined. This may also be due to the observed rate of inflation
being affected by exchange rate movements. As New Zealand dollar is a carry-
trade currency, an increase in the policy rate may cause the New Zealand dollar to
appreciate.
(c) The housing preference shock in the model matches the data very well (Figure 5.1,
third column). Demand rises in response to the increased house prices, and inflation
falls as the interest rate rises. Note that the interest rate response in the model is
slightly negative rather than the positive response we would expect. This is likely
due to the instantaneous disinflationary pressure coming through the model as
agents substitute into housing from consumption. This causes a temporary decline
in output, which recovers as the wealth effect increases consumption and output in
the medium term.
(d) Finally, the fourth column of Figure 5.1 shows that a shock to output in the model
captures the dynamics of the data. An increase in output has a wealth effect
that increases demand for housing. Likewise, increased demand raises inflationary
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Figure 5.1: Comparison of model impulse responses with VAR evidence from New
Zealand
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pressure, which causes the interest rate to rise. Higher interest rates raise borrowing
costs and decrease demand for housing so house prices fall in the medium term.
The magnitude of the impulse responses from the model reasonably matches the re-
sponses in the data for most variables. However, the magnitude of the response of
output and house prices to a monetary policy shock is greater than would be expected
given the data. Nevertheless, as the model is intended for qualitative analysis of the
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impact of different LVR policies rather than to provide a precise quantitative impact
of a particular LVR specification, deviations in magnitude of impulse responses are not
of overriding concern.
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Chapter 6
Policy analysis
This section considers the impulse responses of the model that arise with three different
calibrations of LVR policy. The baseline scenario is an economy without any LVR
restrictions. In this case we assume that mE = mI = 95% such that investors and
impatient households can borrow up to 95% the value of their housing stock. Although
it is not unheard of for banks to lend at LV R ≥ 95%, we assume a moderate level of
prudence in this model so that agents cannot borrow above 95% of the expected value
of their underlying collateral in the following period.
The second scenario that is considered is aligned with the first wave of macroprudential
intervention that the Reserve Bank implemented in 2013. This limited banks lending
above an LVR of 80% to 10% of new mortgage lending. This LVR restriction is imple-
mented in the model as a constraint on any lending to impatient households above 80%
LVR or mI = 0.8.
It is arguable that this constraint should be implemented on housing investors as well
in this scenario, but I have chosen not to do so for two reasons. First, as noted above,
the constraint is applied as a complete restriction on borrowing above 80% in the model
while in New Zealand it was applied with a 10% buffer, so to include investors may
overstate its efficacy. Second, from a policy perspective, part of the reason why the sec-
ond LVR restriction was introduced was due to a perception that the initial restriction
was insufficient to target investors due to their ability to draw capital from alternative
sources. Therefore, it may be inconsistent with observed behaviour to impose this in
the model.
The final scenario incorporates an LVR restriction on both impatient households and
investors in the model. The constraint on impatient households remains at mI = 0.8
in the model, while the constraint on investors is imposed at 70% LVR or mE = 0.7.
This mirrors the level of the policy imposed by the second set of LVR restrictions that
were implemented in 2015.
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6.1 Monetary policy shock
The impulse responses to a monetary policy shock are given in Figure 6.1. The typical
channels are consistent with what would be expected. Consumption falls across all
agents as the heightened interest rate raises the cost of consuming in the current period.
This causes a reduction in demand for output that leads to a fall in capital investment.
As demand for the output good falls, the final goods producer decreases its price, leading
to a decline in inflation in the economy.
Likewise, the increased interest rate makes borrowing more expensive with the conse-
quence that both investors and impatient households decrease their borrowing. Reduced
borrowing precipitates a decline in housing ownership for both investors and impatient
households. This reduces demand for housing in the economy, so house prices and hous-
ing investment fall. As a result of the decreased supply of rental accommodation from
investors, rental prices simulaneously rise. Facing increased rental prices and decreased
house prices, patient households increase their housing ownership in response to the
shock.
As the interest rate falls following the shock, investors and impatient households start
increasing their borrowing and housing ownership. At the same time, all agents start
consuming more as the opportunity cost of consumption falls. Likewise, capital and
housing investment increase as demand for output and housing increases. Output rises
as demand returns to pre-shock levels, along with inflation.
6.1.1 Policy scenarios
The responses indicate that the imposition of investment LVR restriction causes a
marked decrease in the volatility of output while delivering broadly similar interest
rate and inflation profiles. This is due to the change in investor behaviour with the
presence of the LVR restriction. The impact of each set of LVR restrictions will be
described in detail below.
Note that LVR restrictions are another tool with which the Reserve Bank can achieve
its stabilisation objectives. The greater flexibility provided by this additional lever is a
clear benefit to having macroprudential tools within the Reserve Bank’s powers.
Impatient household LVR restriction
First consider the impact of an impatient household LVR restriction. Although impa-
tient housholds reduce their borrowing to a similar extent in response to the increased
interest rates as in the case of no LVR restrictions, impatient households do not divest
as much of their housing ownership. This is due to the need to hold more housing
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to meet the LVR restriction in this scenario. This extra housing comes from patient
households whose ownership of housing does not increase as much in response to the
shock.
As a result of reduced patient household ownership, patient households demand more
rental accommodation. Investors meet this demand by divesting less of their property
in response to the shock. With the increased availability of rental accommodation,
rental prices are slightly lower in the near term in this scenario than in the baseline
scenario with no LVR restrictions.
As impatient households hold more housing with the restriction, they use less rental
housing, which enables them to have higher consumption than without the restriction.
With consumption for patient households and investors unchanged, demand is slightly
higher and capital investment falls by slightly less in the near term than without the
restriction.
However, this is counterbalanced by housing investment, which is slightly reduced due
to the reduced demand for housing from all agents. The net impact of these offsetting
effects is that output is only marginally higher than in the scenario with no LVR
restriction.
Although an impatient household LVR restriction alters the distribution of housing
between different agents in the economy, it only has a marginal impact on other model
variables. Note that the resulting allocation of housing between agents is undesirable
from a financial stability perspective, as patient households’ ownership falls in favour
of impatient household and investor housing ownership. Based on empirical studies,
impatient households and investors are riskier than patient households as they are net
borrowers. However as risk is not modelled in this framework, a full analysis of the risk
or welfare implications of a particular housing allocation is beyond the scope of this
model.
Impatient household and investor LVR restriction
Consider an investor-specific LVR restriction applied together with the impatient house-
hold LVR discussed above. With the higher interest rate, investors significantly reduce
their borrowing, and their investment in housing as a result. As they are constrained
in the amount they can borrow to a certain percentage of their housing stock, even
as the interest rate falls and borrowing becomes less expensive, they cannot increase
their borrowing rapidly. Rather, they continue to be constrained by the LVR restric-
tion, which limits their borrowing to a certain percentage of their now significantly
depleted housing stock. Therefore, investor borrowing and housing remains depressed
for significantly longer than in other policy scenarios.
The inability of investors to quickly begin borrowing again due to the LVR constraint
sustains the impact of the contractionary monetary policy shock in the model. With
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reduced borrowing, investor housing ownership, and accordingly house prices, remain
significantly depressed. The reduced supply of rental accommodation from investors
results in higher rental prices.
Facing lower house prices and higher housing rental rates, patient and impatient house-
holds increase their housing ownership well into the medium term. Due to the offsetting
housing demand from patient and impatient households, housing investment follows a
similar path to that which occurs in the presense of an impatient household LVR re-
striction alone.
With the higher rental prices earned from the housing they still own, investors’ con-
sumption falls by less in the near term than in other policy scenarios. As the path for
patient and impatient household consumption remains unchanged, this buoys demand
and likewise output falls by less in the near term. The extra demand also encourages
slightly higher capital investment in the near term, though it follows a broadly similar
path to other scenarios in the medium term.
6.1.2 Conclusions
LVR restrictions do not change the nature of behaviour in response to a monetary policy
shock, but they do alter the distribution of housing between agents. More importantly,
they encourage higher near term consumption by the constrained agents, so output falls
less in response to the shock. In stabilising the volatility of output, monetary policy
shocks have less of a contractionary impact on the economy in the presence of LVR
restrictions with the same inflation impact.
Investor specific LVR restrictions are powerful in propagating the impact of the ini-
tial shock. Given the divestment of housing that takes place in response to the shock,
investors take many more periods to recover their housing stock, and ability to bor-
row, which changes the distribution of housing ownership toward households for many
periods.
From a financial stability perspective, this is a very attractive feature of this restriction
as it means that borrowing to investors is constrained and their housing ownership
dampened for periods well beyond the length of the initial shock. In particular, house-
holds own more housing than investors relative to steady state values, for many periods
beyond the intial shock. This is achieved with minimal disruption to the transmission
of the shock to real variables - in fact, such a restriction minimises the contractionary
impact of the initial shock, with no change to its efficacy in curbing inflation.
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Figure 6.1: Responses to monetary policy shock
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6.2 Housing preference shock
Figure 6.2 shows the impulse responses of key model variables to a housing preference
shock. A positive housing preference shock increases patient and impatient households’
utility gained from housing consumption, and in turn their demand for housing. Due to
increased demand for housing, house prices rise considerably in response to the shock.
This affects investors’ profit maximising decision as the expected capital gain from
owning housing from one period to the next is now substantially higher. As a result,
investors increase their home ownership significantly. This additional investor housing
is rented to patient households whose house ownership decreases considerably as a result
of the increased house prices. However, with the money saved through renting, patient
households are able to increase their consumption.
On the other hand, impatient households, who benefit from the increased value of hous-
ing in relaxing their collateral constraint, increase their house ownership significantly
and reduce their consumption accordingly. Both impatient households and investors
borrow heavily to finance their additional acquisition of houses. This demand for houses
also encourages greater housing investment, which rises significantly in response to the
shock.
Investors experience an initial surge in consumption due to the increased value of their
collateral enabling them to borrow more, but their consumption likewise falls as re-
sources are instead allocated to further housing investment. Capital investment falls
due to the declining demand for the output good as both investors and impatient house-
holds reduce their consumption. As a result of the lack of consumption and declining
capital investment, output falls after an initial surge due to the wealth effect. This
causes interest rates and inflation to fall in the model.
6.2.1 Policy scenarios
Impatient Household LVR restriction
Consider the impact of an impatient-household-only LVR restriction on the transmis-
sion of a housing preference shock in the model. The restriction constrains impatient
households’ borrowing, and as a result they are less able to purchase houses in the peri-
ods following the shock. As a result, their consumption falls by less in than it did when
there was no LVR restriction. The reduction in demand for housing ownership by im-
patient households is offset by patient households, who reduce their housing ownership
by less in response to the shock.
Due to patient households owning more houses, demand for rental property reduces
with the imposition of this restriction. Investors reduce their ownership of housing
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slightly accordingly, with this reduced supply offsetting the reduced demand from pa-
tient households. As a result, the rental price does not change significantly. With
reduced housing ownership, the investor borrows less and their consumption falls as a
result.
Reduced demand for housing results in lower housing investment. Conversely, capital
investment contracts less in the presence of an LVR restriction due to the higher con-
sumption from impatient households and investors in the medium term. However, this
impact is partially offset by reduced consumption by patient households. As output
and inflation are slightly higher in the medium term, the interest rate path is smoother
and higher than without an LVR restriction.
As the impact of the shock dissipates, housing demand returns to steady state levels,
which allows house prices and rental rates to fall. Investor and impatient household
housing ownership and borrowing likewise return to steady state levels as house prices
fall.
Reduced demand for housing results in lower housing investment and higher capital
investment as the utility trade-off for households between consumption and housing
starts to return to steady state levels. With increased output demand, inflation rises
along with the interest rate as the economy returns to equilibrium.
Impatient Household and Investor LVR restrictions
Now consider the added impact of an investor specific LVR restriction. This constrains
investors’ ability to borrow to acquire more housing in response to the shock, so investor
borrowing and housing are significantly lower in the periods following the shock in the
presence of an investor-specific LVR restriction.
The resulting slack in housing demand is absorbed by patient households whose housing
ownership falls by less in the near term in this scenario. Impatient household borrowing
and housing ownership is broadly unchanged from the imposition of the impatient
household restriction. The reduction in investor housing ownership limits the supply of
rental accommodation causing the rental price to rise.
Despite the higher rental price, investors’ reduced return from providing rental housing
forces them to decrease their consumption. With patient and impatient households’
consumption unchanged from the impatient LVR scenario, the reduction in investor
consumption causes a commensurate fall in output in the near term. As a result,
capital investment falls more in the near term than with no LVR restriction or an
impatient household LVR restriction.
The central bank responds to the reduced inflationary pressure and decreased output
with a swifter and greater decrease in the interest rate. This fall in the interest rate
reduces the cost of borrowing. Investors respond to this decline in interest rates by
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borrowing more and acquiring a higher amount of housing. Increased returns from
renting housing allows their consumption to rise rapidly, which leads to a swift recovery
in output and capital investment. Therefore, the impulse responses in the medium term
match those from the impatient household LVR, but with a swifter recovery in capital
investment.
6.2.2 Conclusions
Although the profiles for house prices and output are broadly similar in the medium
term in all the scenarios, the imposition of an investor specific LVR has a marked
impact on investor housing. Unable to borrow as much against the value of their
property, investors are less active in the property market in this scenario, which allows
patient households’ home ownership to remain higher than in other scenarios.
As a result, the profiles for consumption and output are both smoother despite a small
contraction in the near term. Capital investment is higher (except in the near term)
and smoother than in the absence of an investor specific LVR restriction.
The reallocation of housing from investors to patient households in the presence of an
LVR restriction is particularly relevant from a financial stability perspective. Given the
concerns regarding investors’ greater likelihood of default (a feature not captured in the
model framework), this suggests that LVR restrictions can provide extra stability to
the extent that they moderate the growth of investors’ housing portfolios in favour of
patient households in response to a housing preference shock. Although full analysis of
this issue is beyond the scope of the paper, these redistributional effects would indicate
that LVR restrictions are effective in altering the composition and associated risk of
the lending undertaken in response to exogenous housing demand.
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Figure 6.2: Responses to housing preference shock
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6.3 Technology shock
Figure 6.3 shows the impulse responses of key model variables to a technology shock. A
positive technology shock allows more output to be produced for a given level of inputs.
Therefore, in response to a technology shock, demand for capital falls as the intermedi-
ate goods producer can now produce the same amount of output with a reduced level of
capital. Decreased demand for capital causes investors’ income to fall and they reduce
their consumption and investment in housing accordingly.
Investors reduced consumption causes demand for the output good to fall. This pre-
cipitates a fall in prices and the final and intermediate goods producers to reduce their
production accordingly. At the same time, decreased demand for capital causes capital
investment to fall.
With the depressed price of the output good, patient and impatient households increase
their consumption. Likewise, the reduction in rental property as a result of investors
selling their stock of housing encourages patient and impatient households to increase
their housing ownership. As a result of the increased demand for housing, house prices
rise along with housing investment.
Reduced output demand and decreased inflationary pressure cause the central bank
to reduce interest rates, making borrowing less costly for impatient households and
investors. This encourages impatient households to borrow more to finance more con-
sumption and the acquisition of further housing ownership.
With increased demand for the final good in the economy, both prices and output
increase in the medium term. This increases demand for capital, which provides more
income to investors as the owners of capital. In turn, this enables investors’ consumption
to return to steady state levels.
At the same time, patient and impatient households reduce their consumption as prices
rise. Likewise, as investors’ increased income allows them to increase their housing
ownership to steady state levels, households substitute into rental property again. De-
creased demand for housing allows house prices and housing investment to fall as the
economy returns to steady state.
6.3.1 Policy scenarios
The primary difference in response to the technology shock in the presence of an LVR
restriction is how the falling interest rate is transmitted through the economy. As
demand for output falls following the technology shock, prices fall and the central bank
lowers interest rates in order to stimulate the economy. This makes it more attractive for
impatient households and investors to borrow more given it is now less costly. However,
where there is an LVR restriction, impatient households and investors are limited in
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the amount they can borrow to a certain percentage of their housing ownership. The
impacts of each type of restriction will be discussed in detail below.
Impatient household LVR restriction
In the case of an LVR restriction that applies only to impatient households, impatient
households can borrow less in response to the falling interest rate. As a result, impatient
household consumption and housing ownership rises by less in response to the shock
than with no LVR restriction.
Therefore, output and the interest rate fall by slightly more than in other scenarios.
With reduced demand for housing from impatient households, housing investment is
lower in this scenario than with other LVR restrictions. However, other variables are
not materially affected by the presence of this restriction.
Impatient household and investor LVR restrictions
As noted above, investors’ income falls as demand for capital falls as a result of the
increased productivity of current capital. With the LVR restriction limiting the amount
that investors can borrow, investors reduce their housing ownership even more in re-
sponse to the technology shock. This reduction in housing ownership constrains their
borrowing in future periods, so it takes longer for investors’ level of housing to return
to steady state than in the other scenarios.
With less invested in housing, investors are able to consume more in this scenario,
which increases demand in the economy. As a result of increased demand, output falls
by considerably less in response to the shock than in other scenarios.
With less housing rental being supplied by investors, both patient and impatient house-
holds experience larger and more persistent increases in housing ownership. This more
than offsets the reduction in demand from investors, so housing investment is stronger
in this scenario than in others.
For impatient households who are constrained in their borrowing by an LVR restriction,
additional housing ownership comes at the cost of consumption. With decreased con-
sumption by impatient households, there is decreased output demand in the medium
term and capital investment remains lower than in the other scenarios. The consump-
tion path for patient households is largely unchanged by the LVR restriction being
applied.
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6.3.2 Conclusions
To conclude, investor-specific LVR restrictions cause a pronounced and sustained de-
cline in investor property ownership in response to a technology shock. This has the
result of smoothing the path for output by reducing the loss of investor consumption
in response to the shock.
Impatient households substitute out of consumption into housing ownership in the
presence of an investor specific LVR restriction combined with an impatient household
LVR restriction. This results in a sustained reduction in capital investment in response
to the shock, but a slight increase in housing investment in the medium term. The path
for house prices, inflation and the interest rate is largely unchanged by the presence of
LVR restrictions.
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Figure 6.3: Responses to technology shock
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6.4 Cost-push shock
Figure 6.4 shows the impulse responses of key model variables to a cost-push shock. A
positive cost-push shock increases the cost of the output good in the economy, causing
all agents to decrease their consumption in the economy. This reduces demand for the
output good so that final and intermediate goods producers decrease production, which
reduces demand for the inputs of labour and capital. As demand for capital falls, so
does capital investent.
In response to the added inflationary pressure, the central bank increases its interest
rate. The higher interest rate makes borrowing more expensive so impatient households
and investors decrease their borrowing and further reduce their consumption. At the
same time, patient households earn less from their ownership of the final good firm
and from lending to impatient households and investors, despite the increased cost of
both. As a result, patient households’ income falls and they decrease their demand for
housing in response to the cost-push shock.
With the marked reduction in demand from patient households, house prices fall, en-
couraging investors and impatient households to increase their housing ownership. Nev-
ertheless, the net softening in demand for housing reduces housing investment.
As inflation returns to steady state, the interest rate likewise falls to steady state level.
Falling prices encourage all agents to increase their consumption and production of
the output good increases as a result. The resulting demand for capital causes capital
investment to return to steady state levels.
With the falling interest rate, investors and impatient houseolds are able to increase
their borrowing. Coupled with increased consumption, this increases the profits earned
by patient households, who increase demand for housing ownership. This causes house
prices to rise and impatient households and investors to decrease their housing own-
ership. As a result of the offsetting impacts on housing demand, housing investment
takes longer to return to steady state levels than other variables.
6.4.1 Policy scenarios
The profiles for most variables do not vary materially with different LVR specifications
in response to a cost-push shock. However, different LVR settings do change the way
the shock affects housing ownership for all agents in the economy. The presence of an
LVR restriction also affects the transmission of the shock to housing investment and
consumption, for impatient households in particular. These impacts are detailed in full
in Figure 6.4.
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Impatient household LVR restrictions
First consider an LVR restriction that applies to impatient households only. In response
to this restriction, impatient households consume less as housing ownership becomes
more valuable due to its collateral value. They instead increase their housing ownership
in the medium term, which in turn allows them to increase their borrowing as the
interest rate falls.
The demand effect of this increased housing ownership by impatient households is
offset by patient households, whose housing ownership is reduced in the medium term
relative to in a scenario with no LVR restrictions. Investors’ housing ownership is only
marginally impacted in the near term by an impatient household LVR restriction. All
other variables are largely unaffected by the imposition of an LVR restriction with a
cost-push shock.
Impatient household and investor LVR restrictions
The impacts discussed above are magnified in the case of LVR restrictions that apply
to both impatient households and investors. The most marked change in the presence
of an investor specific LVR restriction is to investors’ housing ownership. Due to the
constraint, the investor cannot borrow enough in the near term to accumulate housing
in response to the decreased house prices as a result of the shock.
As a result, patient households do not divest their housing ownership suddenly as they
did in other scenarios in response to the cost-push shock, but instead reduce their
ownership over the medium term. Impatient households accumulate even more housing
in the near term than in other scenarios, and simultaneously reduce their consumption
accordingly. Housing investment is broadly unchanged, though its profile decreases
slightly with the imposition of each type of LVR restriction.
Other variables are largely unaffected.
6.4.2 Conclusions
The presence of LVR restrictions does not fundamentally alter the propagation of a cost-
push shock to most real variables, but they do have important distributional impacts.
In particular, investor specific LVR restrictions significantly reduce investor activity in
the housing market in response to a cost-push shock. As a result, housing remains held
by patient households in the periods immediately following the shock.
To the extent that housing investors are riskier than patient households in the real
world, this distribution of housing in response to the inflation shock could be argued
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to be favourable from a financial stability perspective (though rigorously proving this
assertion is well beyond the scope of this paper).
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Figure 6.4: Responses to a cost-push shock
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6.5 Steady state impacts of different policy mea-
sures
Assuming an LVR restriction becomes permanent, its implementation would modify
the steady state levels of some variables in the economy. LVR restrictions have direct
impacts on housing-related steady state conditions, but other variables (such as capital
investment/GDP) do not vary with different specifications of the LVR restriction.
Therefore, the impacts on the housing market result in a redistribution from owner-
ship to rental and from mortgagees to unencumbered households. These redistribution
effects are particularly interesting as they give insight into how the structure of the
housing market changes in response to these restrictions.
A summary of the steady state impacts of different LVR measures on housing related
variables are available in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Steady state impacts of alternative LVR measures
Impatient HH LVR Investor LVR Both
Residential investment/GDP −0.92% −0.28% −1.19%
Rental price 0% 12.2% 12.2%
Rental share 2.38% −4.04% −1.75%
Share of housing with mortgage −6.06% 0.17% −5.92%
6.5.1 Impatient household LVR restrictions
Consider first the impact of an impatient household LVR restriction. The LVR limits the
ability of impatient households to borrow, so as a result their demand for housing falls.
With this reduction in housing demand, residential investment/GDP contracts −0.92%
to 3.56% of GDP. With the reduced demand for housing ownership from impatient
households, the rental share of the housing market increases 2.38% to 48.98% housing.
With increased demand for rental offset with reduced supply of housing, the steady
state rental price does not change with this scenario. Finally, the LVR restriction
makes borrowing less attractive, so the share of housing with a residential mortgage
falls −6.06% to 49.25%.
6.5.2 Investor LVR restrictions
Next consider the impact of an investor specific LVR restriction in the model. In
the presence of an investor specific LVR restriction, investors are constrained in the
amount they can borrow so their ownership of housing decreases relative to patient and
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impatient households. As investors’ borrowing contracts, impatient households borrow
slightly more, which they use to fund additional acquisition of housing.
With reduced housing ownership by investors, the supply of rental propoerty decreases,
so rental prices rise 12.19% and the rental share of the market falls −4.04% to 42.56%.
As a result of the reduction in availability of rental houses, demand for housing owner-
ship from patient and impatient households increases, so residential investment/GDP
only falls by 0.28% to 4.2%. At the same time, the share of housing with a mortgage
increases marginally by 0.17% to 55.48% of the housing market.
6.5.3 Both impatient household and investor specific LVR re-
strictions
Finally consider the case of both an investor specific LVR restriction and an impatient
household LVR restriction imposed at the same time. In that case, the investors are
constrained in the amount they can borrow so their housing ownership decreases relative
to that of patient households. However, at the same time, impatient households are
also constrained in the amount they can borrow so their demand for housing ownership
similarly falls. As a result, impatient households and investors’ borrowing declines
considerably. This results in a contraction in consumption for patient households whose
profits have fallen as the owners of the goods firm.
Decline in demand for new housing precipitates a decline in residential investment/GDP,
which falls 1.19% to 3.29%. Offsetting their reduced demand for housing ownership,
impatient households demand more rental property and housing investors do not divest
as much of their housing stock as a result. Higher investor ownership results in a
relatively higher supply of rental property, so the rental share of the market only declines
by 1.75% to 44.85%. With higher demand for rental accommodation from impatient
households, the rental price rises by 12.19% relative to the steady state of no LVR
restrictions.
6.5.4 Summary
From this analysis, it is clear that permanent application of LVR restrictions has impacts
on the steady state distribution of the housing market. This has important implications
for how money is spent and invested in the economy. Based on what we know of the
risk profiles of different classes of borrowers in the real world, these changes also have
implications for risk in the economy. We can conclude the following stylised facts from
the above steady state analysis:
(a) Imposition of LVR restrictions will lead to a decline in residential investment re-
gardless of the agent they constrain. However, the magnitude of the decline is far
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greater when the restriction constrains the impatient household compared to when
it constrains investors.
(b) As impatient household LVR restrictions do not directly constrain the supply of
rental accommodation, they have no impact on the rental price. However, investor
LVRs lead to a decline in the supply of rental accommodation that increases rents.
(c) Impatient households demand greater rental accommodation when constrained by
an impatient household LVR restriction. This heightened demand leads to an in-
crease in the rental share of the market, whereas an investor LVR restriction con-
strains supply such that the rental share of the housing market also declines.
(d) Investor LVR restrictions have a negligible impact on the share of housing with a
mortgage, whereas impatient household restrictions lead to a severe constraction in
the share of housing with a mortgage.
(e) Investors’ borrowing invariably falls in response to any LVR restriction, regardless
of the agent it constrains. Impatient households’ borrowing is significantly reduced
where there is an impatient household LVR restriction, but increases slightly where
there is only an investor specific LVR restriction.
(f) Patient households’ consumption invariably falls slightly in response to the imposi-
tion of an LVR restriction, while investors and impatient households increase their
consumption regardless of the agent constrained by the restriction. The net impact
of this is that there is a substitution from residential investment to consumption in
response to an LVR restriction in this framework.
Although financial stability and housing supply issues are beyond the scope of what can
be examined within this model, the framework is sufficiently broad to provide insight
into how the permanent application of LVR restrictions would impact the optimising
decisions of the agents within the model. If we assume there is an exogenous driver
that is increasing demand for housing then implementation of a permanent LVR restric-
tion has desirable properties: it diverts investment away from housing and increases
consumption while reducing risky agents’ borrowing.
However, if the exogenous driver increasing demand for housing is a supply constraint,
then this framework implies that the response of limiting residential investment is the
opposite of what is necessary to redress the imbalance. Nevertheless, the reduction in
risky borrowing is desirable from a financial stability perspective, but the long-term
structural change required to redress the supply imbalance would not come endoge-




This paper introduces a framework for examining the impact of LVR restrictions on the
transmission of monetary policy and the business cycle. It is timely as many central
banks around the world have started adding macroprudential tools to their toolkit, but
how these tools interact with the transmission of monetary policy is yet not broadly
understood.
The scenario analysis in Section VI showed that LVR restrictions reduce output fluctu-
ations in response to monetary policy shocks. This is especially the case with investor
specific LVR restrictions, where the investor quickly divests property in response to the
increased interest rate and then only gradually rebuilds their housing stock following
the shock. As a result of these dynamics, increased interest rates suppress investor
activity far longer in the presence of an investor specific LVR restriction than without
it.
In terms of transmission of monetary policy, these responses indicate that LVR restric-
tions are advantageous to a flexible inflation targeting central bank as they allow the
central bank to respond to inflation more given the reduced variation in output. This
is consistent with the responses to a technology shock where an investor specific LVR
is similarly effective at smoothing investor consumption and, accordingly, output by
moderating investor activity in the housing market.
With a housing preference shock, the constraint on investors’ capacities to borrow in
response to the shock results in smoother consumption and output paths. Crucially, as
consumption remains higher with the investor specific LVR restriction, capital invest-
ment is higher and smoother than in other scenarios. This reflects the earlier finding
that below an LVR of 78%, there is a trade off between volatility of capital investment
and volatitility of housing investment.
Although risk analysis is beyond the scope of the model, the redistribution of housing
toward patient and impatient households in response to a housing preference shock
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implies an increase in financial stability, given analysis suggests that investors are at
higher risk of default in the event of a downturn (Kelly and O’Malley (2014)).
This redistribution of housing ownership toward different agents also occurs in response
to a cost-push shock in the presence of an LVR restriction. In particular, investor
housing ownership is significantly reduced in the presence of an investor specific LVR
restriction following a cost-push shock relative to the scenario of a cost-push shock
without an LVR restriction.
Comparing the steady state of the model under different LVR assumptions also pro-
vides insight how permanent application of an LVR restriction would affect key housing
market variables in the longer term. From steady state analysis, it is possible to derive
the following stylised facts about the long term impacts of LVR restrictions on the
economy:
(a) Regardless of the agent that an LVR restriction constrains, it leads to a decline in
residential investment to GDP, leading to higher consumption in the economy.
(b) Investor specific LVR restrictions lead to decreased rental supply and increased
rents.
(c) Impatient household LVR restrictions lead to a severe contraction in the percentage
of housing with a mortgage.
(d) Implementation of any LVR restriction causes investors borrowing to fall, regardless
of the agent the restriction constrains.
Overall, this model suggests that LVR restrictions can be effective in moderating the
business cycle by curbing swings in demand for housing in response to a variety of
shocks. This allows a flexible inflation targeting central bank to more directly set the
interest rate to target inflation.
There are many areas of future development for this research. First, one could con-
sider extending this paper to include risk premia and a banking sector, to explore how
risk-related spreads coupled with LVR restrictions affect the transmission of monetary
policy. Another possible area would be to extend the model to make it an open econ-
omy model to allow consideration of how the availability of credit from abroad changes
the business cycle impacts of LVR restrictions.
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vI c̄I = ξ4
c̄I
h̄I
b̄I = βPmI q̄hh̄Io(1− δh) =
βPmI(1− δh)ξ4c̄I
∆Io
c̄I = w̄I L̄I + b̄I − R̄b̄
I
π̄


















c̄P = w̄P L̄P + F + b̄P − R̄b̄
P
π̄














































b̄E = βPmE q̄hh̄E(1− δh)
c̄E =
(
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Appendix B
The log-linearised model


















ˆcPt+1 − R̂t + Et ˆπt+1
βP ĉIt = β
IEt
ˆcIt+1 − (βP − βI)λ̂It − βP R̂t + βIEt ˆπt+1
βP ĉEt = γEt






























o,t + Et ˆπt+1 − R̂t
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B.3 Aggregate supply equations
Ŷt = Ât + µ ˆKt−1 + α(1− µ)L̂Pt + (1− α)(1− µ)L̂It
Ŷt = ηL̂It + ĉ
I
t − X̂t
Ŷt = ηL̂Pt + ĉ
P
t − X̂t




















B.4 Housing market equations
q̂ht = γ
EEt
ˆqht+1 + (1− βPme(1− δh)− q̄rAr)ĉEt + q̄rArq̂rt − γ(1− δh)(1−me)Et ˆcEt+1
− βPme(1− δh)(R̂t − Et ˆπt+1)
q̂ht = γ
hEt












−miβP (1− δh)(R̂t − Et ˆπt+1)
+ (1− βPmi(1− δh))ĉIt − βI(1− δh)(1−mi)Et ˆcIt+1
q̂rt = ĉ
I




























+ ĉPt − βP (1− δh)Et ˆcPt+1
q̂rt = ĉ
P
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B.5 Flow of funds/ evolution of state variables
K̂t = δkÎkt + (1− δk) ˆKt−1























(δkq̂kt + K̂t − (1− δk) ˆKt−1) +
b̄ER̄
Ȳ




















( ˆRt−1 − π̂t + ˆbIt−1)− si(Ŷt − X̂t)
B.6 Monetary policy rule and shock processes
R̂t = (1− rr)(1 + rπ) ˆπt−1 + ry(1− rr) ˆYt−1 + rr ˆRt−1 + εr
ĵt = ρj ˆjt−1 + εj
ût = ρu ˆut−1 + εu
Ât = ρA ˆAt−1 + εA
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Appendix C
Technical derivations
This section provides the derivations of the steady state and log-linearisations for the
equations in the paper.
C.1 Patient Households
Patient households gain utility from consumption cPt , housing h
P
t , and lose utility from
























where βP is the rate at which patient households discount future utility.
Patient households have the option of consuming housing either through ownership hPo,t
or by renting housing hPr,t from period to period. Ownership comes at the nominal cost
of Qht while rental is available at the nominal cost of Q
r
t . The utility provided from

















where vP measures the elasticity of substitution between rental and home ownership and
ωP measures the share of each type of housing that they consume. Their consumption
of housing is also subject to a preference shock jPt and depreciation of δh per period.
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Patient households also face a budget constraint that limits the amount of spending of
consumption, housing and deposits to wages earned in the previous period, and deposits















Patient households also face an adjustment cost associated with changing the amount
of housing that it uses each period. To reflect the differences in costs associated with
home ownership (for example, solicitor’s fees and building inspections) we assume the
cost is only incurred for changing the amount of home ownership. The adjustment cost











where φPo is the parameter that governs the adjustment costs.
Given this budget constraint and adjustment cost, we can write the maximisation prob-



























t − bPt − wPt LPt
)]
Differentiating with respect to the patient households’ choice variables (consumption,
































































































C.1.1 The steady state
From the first order conditions, we can calculate the following steady state relationships.
Assuming a steady state of π = 1 we have from the patient household’s first order






⇔ R = 1
βP













From the patient household’s first order condition with respect to housing rental we
have:




































qh(1− βP (1− δh))
)vP ωP
1− ωP

















Raising both sides to vP−1
vP























































Using this condition we can solve for steady state house prices as a function of steady
state consumption and housing consumption as follows:










vp c̄P = ξ3
c̄P
h̄P




= bP + wPLP + F − qrhPr − qhδhhPo









Using the first order condition with respect to the intermediate good producers’ use of
labour from patient households, wPLP = α(1−µ)Y
X







+ sPY − qrhPr − qhδhhPo
where sP = α(1−µ)+X−1
X
.
From the resource constraint for borrowing (bP + bI + bE = 0), this can be rewritten as:


































Using the steady state of the entrepreneur’s housing rental this becomes:
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Similar to patient households, impatient households choose consumption (cIt ), borrowing
(bIt ), housing (h
I
t ), and labour supply (L
I























We assume that the the impatient households have a lower discount factor on future
utility than patient households (giving rise to the description ’impatient’) so βI < βP .
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Impatient households have the option of consuming housing either through ownership
or by renting housing from period to period. Ownership comes at the nominal cost of
Qht while rental is available at the nominal cost of Q
r
t . The utility provided from each

















Impatient households earn income in one period through labour supply and borrowing
that they use to pay for consumption, housing and to repay previous period’s borrowing.
Dividing the nominal prices by the price level Pt allows their budget constraint can















where δh is the depreciation of houses from one period to the next. Impatient households
are also subject to a borrowing constraint that limits the amount they can borrow to a
certain proportion (mI) of the expected value of the housing hIo,t that they own:
Rtb
I
t ≤ EtmIqht+1(1− δh)hIo,tπt+1
This means that in addition to the utility that house ownership provides, house own-
ership also allows the impatient household to borrow more as the collateral constraint
is relaxed. As with patient households, impatient households face an adjustment cost











By writing the budget constraint in terms of consumption, then substituting this def-
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The first order conditions with respect to the impatient household’s choice variables
































































This means that when the impatient household buys housing hIo,t, the cost is q
h
t plus
the adjustment cost associated with changing its level of housing use from the previous
period. The benefits of acquiring housing in the current period include any capital gain
the impatient household attains on the property, possibly avoiding higher adjustment
costs in the future, and the increased collateral value of the underlying housing (that






















ηI−1 ≡ wIt = (LIt )η
I−1cIt
C.2.1 The steady state






+ λIR⇔ λI = β
P − βI
cI
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Note that the above two conditions with respect to impatient household’s housing
ownership and housing rental can be solved for cI and equated to each other as follows:
jI





















qhhI(1− (1−mI)(1− δh)βI − βPmI(1− δh))
]vI ωI
1− ωI
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Rearranging the impatient household’s first order condition with respect to house own-










vI c̄I = ξ4
c̄I
h̄I
We can substitute this into the steady state of the impatient household’s borrowing
constraint to give:




From the intermediate good firm’s first order condition with respect to labour supplied
by impatient households we have:
w̄IL̄I = (1− α)(1− µ) Ȳ
X̄
= sI Ȳ
Substituting both this and the steady state borrowing constraint for impatient house-
holds into their budget constraint we have:
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c̄I = w̄IL̄I + b̄I − R̄b̄
I
π̄
− qhhIo − qrhIr



















Investors aim to maximise their consumption by investing in houses, making houses
available for rental for patient and impatient households and by renting capital to the
intermediate goods producer. Note that investors are different from impatient and
patient households in only having consumption in their utility function. They therefore
treat houses as a financial investment for which the return is the rent received in one
period and the expected capital gain. This specification likely captures the motives of
housing investors in the New Zealand market as distinct from owner-occupiers per the
LVR policy.





where Ar is a parameter that acts as a proxy for the efficiency of the rental market. This
parameter covers things such as risk of vacancy, damage, enforceability of contracts, etc.
Rental accommodation is made available to households at the nominal price of Qrt (or
the real price of qrt =
Qrt
Pt
). It follows that in order to close the rental market it must be
the case that the housing made available for rental by the investor is equal to the total
















This maximisation problem is subject to a budget constraint. Investors’ costs include
consumption, housing, and inflation-adjusted repayment of borrowing from the previous
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period (Rt−1
πt
bEt−1). The budget constraint states that these costs must be equal to the
entrepreneur’s revenue from housing and capital rental in that period (stated in terms

























where δk and δh are the depreciation rates of capital and housing respectively. As with
patient and impatient households, investors also face adjustment costs for changing the












where φE is the parameter that governs the level of the adjustment costs.
Finally, as with impatient households, entrepreneurs are subject to a borrowing con-
straint that restricts their level of borrowing to a certain proportion of the expected




t ≤ mEqht+1(1− δh)hEt πt+1
By solving the budget constraint for consumption, we can summarise the utility max-






































t − Et(mE(1− δk)qt+1hEt πt+1
)]






















































This means that when the investor buys housing hEt , the cost is q
h
t plus the adjustment
cost associated with changing its level of housing use from the previous period. The
benefits of acquiring housing in the current period include the rental value of housing,
any capital gain attained on the property, avoidance of higher adjustment costs in the
future, and the increased collateral value of the underlying housing that relaxes the

















C.3.1 The steady state






+ λER⇔ λE = 1
cE
(βP − γ)

























1− γ(1− δh) + (βP − γ)mE(1− δh)
)
Ar
Likewise, the steady state for investor’s rental with respect to patient and impatient
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The investor’s borrowing constraint has the following steady state:
bE = βPmEqhhE(1− δh)







E + rkK − qhδh − qkδk
cE = qrArh
E + rkK − qhδh − qkδk − (1− βP )mEqhhE(1− δh)
cE =
(







Finally the steady state value of housing for investors can be found by using the steady




















C.4 Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms that are owned by house-
holds that produce the intermediate goods. These intermediate goods producers use
labour from patient households, labour from impatient households and capital to pro-
duce a differentiated final output, Yt(j) that they sell to the final goods producer at
price Pt(j). The production function for each intermediate goods producer is therefore
given by:





where At is an AR(1) technology shock.








where epsilonp is the degree of substitution between the different types of goods in the
market.
Therefore each intermediate good producer seeks to minimise the cost of their inputs











t (j) + r
k
tKt(j)



























Differentiating with respect to the choice variables of capital, labour from patient house-
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This has the following steady state (using the steady state relationship derived below






For labour supplied by patient households the first order condition is:
∂L
∂LPt (j)
= 0⇔ −wPt +RMCt
(
AtKt(j)










For labour supplied by impatient households is:
∂L
∂LIt (j)














Note that as intermediate firms face the same factor prices, they will hire capital and
labour in the same ratios, which will in turn be equal to the aggregate ratios. Therefore
we can drop the j that differentiates the different firms in production. The Lagrangian






[µ]µ[(1− α)(1− µ)](1−α)(1−µ)[α(1− µ)]α(1−µ)
The real profit flow to each firm j can be written as the amount of output it produces
multiplied by the price it charges, minus the marginal cost per unit multiplied by the
amount of output. Therefore, intermediate goods producers seek to maximise:






We assume that intermediate goods producers are subject to Calvo (1983) pricing where
only a fraction (1− θ) of intermediate goods firms can adjust their prices each period,
then there is a probability θ that a firm will be stuck with its previous price for one
period. Therefore, the average price level in the economy will be an aggregate of the





t−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−εp
where Pt−1 is the price from the previous period and P
∗
t is the average price charged by
firms that have their opportunity to reset in that period. The demand function faced







for any period s ≥ 0 for which the firm will retain the same price. With this demand












where ∆t,s is the patient households stochastic discount factor given by: ∆t,s =
u′(cPt )
u′(cPt+s)


































































This shows that all updating firms in a given period will update to the same price so
that P ∗t (j) = P
∗
t .
Define the steady state mark-up as X = εp





























Let MCt+s = RMCt+sPt+s so that solving for P
∗
t the above expression can be written
as:



















Substituting in the definition of Y astt+s this can be written as:










If θ = 0 then the equation for the optimal price reduces to P ∗t =
εp
εp−1MCt. That is, if
firms are able to update their prices every period then the the optimal price would be a
fixed mark up εp
εp−1 over nominal marginal cost. This gives the steady state P = XMC.
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(−P̂t + ∆̂t,s + ˆMCt+s + ˆYt+s + (ε− 1) ˆPt+s)




(βP θ)s(P̂ ∗t ) =
∞∑
s=0




P θ)s is an infinite series, this can be approximated by (1− βP θ) so that:
P̂ ∗t = (1− βP θ)
∞∑
s=0
(βP θ)sEt( ˆRMCt+s + ˆPt+s)
That is,
P̂ ∗t = (1− βP θ)( ˆRMCt + P̂t) + βP θEt ˆP ∗t+1
Multiplying both sides by (1− θ):
(1− θ)P̂ ∗t = (1− θ)[(1− βP θ)( ˆRMCt + P̂t) + βP θEt ˆP ∗t+1
Substituting in the log-linearised definition of the aggregate price level ((1 − θ)P̂ ∗t =
P̂t − θ ˆPt−1) this is:
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P̂t − θ ˆPt−1 = (1− θ)(1− βP θ)( ˆRMCt + P̂t) + βP θ(Et ˆPt+1 − θP̂t)
P̂t − ˆPt−1 = −(1− θ) ˆPt−1 + (1− θ)(1− βP θ)( ˆRMCt + P̂t) + βP θ(Et ˆPt+1 − θP̂t)
P̂t − ˆPt−1 = (1− θ)(P̂t − ˆPt−1)− βP θ(1− θ)P̂t + (1− θ)(1− βP θ) ˆRMCt + βP θ(Et ˆPt+1 − P̂t)
+ θβP (1− θ)P̂t
From the log-lineasrised definition of inflation π̂t = P̂t − ˆPt−1 this is:
π̂t = (1− θ)π̂t + θβPEt ˆπt+1 + (1− θ)(1− βP θ) ˆRMCtπ̂t = βPEt ˆπt+1 +
(1− θ)(1− βP θ)
θ
ˆRMCt
Substituting κ = (1−θ)(1−β
P θ)
θ
, this is simply an expectations augmented Phillips curve.
πt = β
p ˆπt+1 + κ ˆRMCt
C.5 Capital producers
Capital producers purchase the final good from firms at the price of Pt after final goods
production has taken place. They combine this with the undepreciated capital from
investors that they purchase at the relative price of qkt to produce the capital stock for
the next period. This allows production to be described by the following law of motion:











where κk is the parameter governing the adjustment costs that apply to changing the
level of investment from period to period. Zkt is an investment-specific technological
change shock which is assumed to be exogenous and follow an AR(1) process.
Following production, the capital producer sells its capital stock back to investors at







qktKt − qkt (1− δk)Kt−1 − PtIkt
]
This is subject to the law of motion for capital production that can be rewritten in
terms of investment as follows:
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Differentiating with respect to the choice variable of investment we have:
∂
∂Ikt
































Log-linearising this expression we obtain:















































This can be simplified to:
Îkt =
1





(1 + βP )
ˆIkt−1 +
βP
(1 + βP )
ˆIkt+1
C.6 Housing Producers
Housing producers function in a similar way to the capital goods producers. At the
end of the period they purchase the existing housing stock off the patient households,
impatient households and investors at the market price qht . They combine this housing
stock with investment the investment good to produce the final stock of housing for
that period. Therefore, the evolution of the housing stock can be described by the
following law of motion:
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where κh is the parameter that governs the adjustment costs associated with changing
the investment in housing. Zht is an exogenous housing-investment-specific shock that
is assumed to follow an AR(1) process.
Following production, the housing producer sells the new housing stock back to the
patient households, impatient households and investor at the price of qht . Therefore,
analogously to the capital producer, the profit maximisation problem for the housing


























The first order condition with respect to the investment in housing is:
∂
∂Iht






































(1 + βP )
ˆIht−1 +
βP
(1 + βP )
ˆIht+1
Appendix D
Comparison to Iacoviello (2005)
Figure D.1 shows a comparison of the impulse responses of model proposed in this
paper to Iacoviello (2005)’s paper in response to a monetary policy shock. Where there
is no analogue to Iacoviello (2005)’s paper, only the responses from the new model are
shown. This analysis is useful to show the ways in which the model is consistent with
Iacoviello (2005) and to check that the areas where it deviates from Iacoviello (2005)’s
basline model can be explained by changes to the model structure or calibration.
Note that the calibration for the LVR restrictions used in this scenario match those
in the Iacoviello (2005)’s paper for more precise comparability. That is, the impatient
household LVR restriction is assumed to be very tight at 55% while the investor-specific
LVR restriction is very loose at 89%. This means the analysis is most directly compa-
rable to the impatient household LVR scenario outlined in the paper.
The responses are similar in both direction and magnitude to the Iacoviello paper. The
responses of inflation and house prices are very similar to the Iacoviello paper, as one
would expect given there has been little modification to the components of the model
that directly calculate these variables. On the other hand, the responses of investment,
housing ownership, consumption and output differ from Iacoviello (2005)’s model.
In particular, the proposed model results in a different distribution of property and con-
sumption between different agents in the economy. As the cost of borrowing increases,
investors reduce their demand for housing, which increases the demand from patient
households and impatient households, which face a very tight borrowing constraint
from the LVR restriction. Unlike Iacoviello (2005)’s model, the housing supply is not
fixed, so although housing investment falls in the near term, impatient households and
investors are able to retain a higher level of housing than in the baseline model.
Patient households reduce their consumption by more in the near term relative to
the Iacoviello (2005) model. Conversely, investors consume more as they sell their
housing stock, which buoys demand and encourages more capital investment. Given
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Figure D.1: Comparison of responses with Iacoviello (2005) to a monetary policy shock
the increased housing purchased by impatient households, they are able to borrow more
in the presence of the LVR restriction, so likewise increase their consumption relative
to the baseline model. As there is more demand for consumption in the revised model,
output falls by less in the near term than in Iacoviello (2005).
From this analysis, it is clear that the key mechanisms driving the changed behaviour
of agents in the revised model is the housing production sector that allows the economy
to respond to increased housing demand and the investor’s choice between capital and
housing investment. Therefore, the model is consistent with Iacoviello (2005)’s with
appropriate deviations given the changes to the structure of the model.
Appendix E
Alternative calibrations for the
LVR restriction
This section considers the impact of alternative calibrations of the LVR restriction on
the transmission of a monetary policy shock through the model. It first shows the
impact of different levels of impatient household LVR restrictions varying in increments
of 5% from 50% to 95% assuming no investor LVR restriction is present (i.e. a 95%
investor LVR is assumed). In a similar vein, the second section considers the impact
of different levels of the investor specific LVR restriction assuming that there is no
impatient household restriction. Finally, the third section will consider how the two
restrictions interact with each other.
E.1 Impatient household LVR restriction
This section considers the impact of varying the level of the impatient household LVR
restriction assuming that there is no investor specific LVR restriction imposed in the
model, which is equivalent to assuming that the investor housing restriction is fixed at
95%.
E.1.1 Interest rate and consumption responses
From Figure E.1, it is clear that the primary channel through which the impatient
household LVR restriction impacts the model is through impatient household consump-
tion, with consumption varying from −1% in response to the monetary policy response
where the impatient household LVR restriction is as its loosest to −3% when the LVR
restriction is at its tightest. Investor consumption similarly falls more in the presence
of a tight impatient household LVR restriction than it does in the
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Figure E.1: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different impatient household
LVR restrictions








































E.1.2 Investment, output and inflation responses
Figure E.2 shows that the fall in impatient household and investor consumption in
the presence of a tighter impatient household LVR restriction leads to a greater fall
in capital investment and output. However, as impatient households increase their
housing with a tighter LVR restriction, housing investment falls by slightly less in the
presence of a tighter impatient household LVR. Given these offsetting impacts, the path
for inflation is broadly unchanged regardless of the LVR restriction.
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Figure E.2: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different impatient household
LVR restrictions





































E.1.3 Housing market responses
As noted above, Figure E.3 shows that impatient household housing ownership increases
rapidly as the LVR restriction tightens. This allows them to undertake greater borrow-
ing in the current period. Weak demand for capital due to reduced demand for output
causes investors to have significantly less income to invest in housing, which leads them
to divest their housing stock. The reduced demand from investors causes house prices
to fall, leading patient households to likewise increase their housing ownership consid-
erably. With patient and impatient households demanding less rental accommodation,
investors further reduce their interests in housing. Consequently, patient and impa-
tient household ownership is higher, and investor ownership significantly reduced, in
the presence of an LVR restriction on impatient households.
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Figure E.3: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different impatient household
LVR restrictions
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Impatient household housing ownership
E.2 Investor LVR restriction
This section considers the impact of varying the level of the investor LVR restriction
assuming that there are no impatient household LVR restrictions imposed in the model,
which is equivalent to assuming that the impatient household housing restriction is fixed
at 95%.
E.2.1 Interest rate and consumption responses
From Figure E.4, it is unsurprising that the level of the investor LVR restriction has
little impact on the transmission of the monetary policy shock to the interest rate in
the model. The pass-through of the monetary policy shock to consumption is strongly
impacted by the level of the LVR restriction, especially for patient households and
investors. As the LVR restriction tightens, investors have to reduce consumption by a
greater degree in order to rebalance toward investment in housing, which is discussed
below. This also impacts the trade off between housing and consumption for patient
households, who consume less in the medium term when there is an investor specific
E.2. INVESTOR LVR RESTRICTION 109
LVR restriction in place.
Figure E.4: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different investor LVR restric-
tions
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E.2.2 Investment, output and inflation responses
With agents consuming less with tighter LVR restrictions, Figure E.5 shows that output
falls more where there is a tighter LVR restriction. With reduced demand, capital
investment also falls by more where there is a tighter LVR restriction. This impact is
partially offset by housing investment, which falls by less in the near term in response to
the monetary policy shock in the presence of a tighter investor-specific LVR restriction,
though it takes longer to return to steady state than in the case of no LVR restriction.
The inflation profile is largely unchanged, although inflation does recover slightly faster
for tighter levels of the LVR restriction.
Figure E.5: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different investor LVR restric-
tions
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E.2.3 Housing market responses
Figure E.6 shows that patient households, the net savers in the economy, benefit from
the increased interest rates as a response of the monetary policy shock so increase their
housing ownership. With reduced demand for capital from the intermediate goods pro-
ducer, the investor’s income falls, so it divests some of its housing ownership. Reduced
demand from investors causes house prices to fall. With reduced house prices and in-
creased rental costs as a result of the reduced supply of investor housing available for
rental, it becomes more favourable for the impatient household to purchase housing,
depite the higher interest rates. The initial drop in impatient household owenrship fol-
lowed by the quick recovery in response to the shock reflects these conflicting dynamics
at work.
It is interesting to note the dynamics in the housing market with different levels of LVR
restriction. Tighter investor LVR restrictions mean that investor housing is reduced
more in the near term as investors have less capacity to borrow, but recovers more
quickly as owning houses becomes more valuable due to their ability to be used as
collateral. Similarly, patient household housing rises even more in the near term where
there is a tight investor LVR restriction, but likewise falls more swiftly to steady state
levels as investor housing ownership recovers to steady state levels. Impatient household
housing ownership has similar dynamics to patient households, with a swifter rise and
then fall in housing ownership in the presence of a tighter LVR restriction.
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Figure E.6: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different investor LVR restric-
tions
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Impatient household housing ownership
E.3 Both LVR restrictions simultaneously
The next section focusses on the impact of varying both types of LVR restrictions
simulataneously to observe how interactions between the two restrictions affects the
transmission of the monetary policy shock. For ease of analysis, we will hold one
LVR restriction at either its minimum and its maximum level while allowing the other
to varying along a spectrum of all plausible LVR restrictions (i.e. 50% to 95%) in
increments of 5%. First we will consider the impact of different levels of the impatient
household LVR restriction with the investor specific LVR restriction set at 50% and
90%. Next, we will consider the impact of different levels of the investor household
LVR restriction with the impatient household restriction set at 50% and 90%.
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E.3.1 Responses to variations in the impatient household LVR
at fixed values of the investor LVR
Interest rate and consumption responses
Figure E.7: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different impatient LVR re-
strictions holding investor restrictions fixed at extremes
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Investment, output and inflation responses
Figure E.8: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different impatient LVR re-
strictions holding investor restrictions fixed at extremes
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Housing market responses
Figure E.9: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different impatient LVR re-
strictions holding investor restrictions fixed at extremes
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E.3.2 Responses to variations in the investor LVR at fixed
values of the impatient household LVR
Interest rate and consumption responses
Figure E.10: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different investor LVR restric-
tions holding impatient household restrictions fixed at extremes
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Investment, output and inflation responses
Figure E.11: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different investor LVR restric-
tions holding impatient household restrictions fixed at extremes
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Housing market responses
Figure E.12: Responses to a monetary policy shock with different investor LVR restric-
tions holding impatient household restrictions fixed at extremes
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Appendix F
Summary of key papers in the
literature
F.1 The Financial Accelerator Channel
F.1.1 Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
One of the early contributions to this literature was the seminal model of Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) that introduced borrowers and lenders into an overlapping generations
model. In this model, entrepreneurs produce capital using a combination of their assets
and borrowed funds, and only they are able to observe the success of their individual
projects. The lenders who they borrow from have to pay monitoring costs to verify
whether the entrepreneurs’ investment projects have been successful. In the overlapping
generations framework, each agent only lives a limited time so the model abstracts from
issues of reputation and the consequences of differing rates of capital investment over
time.
Households in this model decide how many goods to consume and how much to save.
Household savings are lent to the financial agent (lender) at the risk free rate, and are
then used by entrepreneurs in investment projects. These investment projects produce
capital goods. Uncertainty over the outcome of these investment projects, coupled with
monitoring costs, forces entrepreneurs to pay a positive premium to lenders in order to
secure funding. This restricts the availability of funding to entrepreneurs to produce
capital. This premium is essential to the financial accelerator mechanism, with its
procyclical properties creating the strong supply shocks to the rest of the economy.
If households choose to spend rather than save they consume an output good. This
good is produced from a combination of capital and labour. If not consumed in one
period, this output good is transformed into a capital good according to the investment
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technology of the entrepreneur.
A positive productivity shock in this model increases the expected growth in the
price of capital. The higher price of capital would increase profit expectations for
entrepreneurs, who increase their demand for input goods to produce capital and offer
an increased returns from investment projects. Higher profits for entrepreneurs increase
their wealth and decrease consumers’ monitoring costs for entrepreneurs’ investments
(as entrepreneurs are lower risk due to higher wealth). Lower monitoring costs lower the
price for entrepreneurs to borrow from households in turn stimulating further growth
of investment and capital production. These secondary round impacts of a produc-
tivity shock leading to higher investment have been called the ’financial accelerator’
mechanism in subsequent literature.
F.1.2 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) consider a real business cycle (RBC) model with costly
verification of the outcome of the entrepreneurs’ investment. They use this model to
analyse the optimal lending contract between entrepreneurs and financial intermedi-
aries. This paper finds that net worth in the presence of agency costs causes a delay
in the response of variables to different kinds of shocks. For example, in response to
a positive technology shock, net worth increases slightly as the increased productivity
boots entrepreneurs’ wage and rental income. However, as capital is initially fixed, net
worth is unable respond instantly. Instead, increased demand for capital in subsequent
periods increases the price of capital, driving up the return to internal funds.
This has both direct and indirect effects on entrepreneurs’ net worth as the increased
return also causes entrepreneurs to reduce their consumption. This gradual increase in
investment leads investment to have a hump-shaped impulse response to a technology
shock. In turn, this generates hump-shaped responses to consumption (negative after
the initial increase), hours worked, and output. Hump-shaped impulse responses are
empirically appealing as they better match what is observed in the data (Cogley and
Nason (1995)). However, being an RBC model with fully flexible prices, this model did
not test the impact of agency costs on the efficacy of monetary policy or other nominal
variables.
F.1.3 Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999
Bernanke et al. (1999)(hereafter BGG) answered this limitation by incorporating this
financial accelerator mechanism into an infinitely lived New Keynesian DSGE model
with price rigidities. In this framework, households are net savers that transfer resources
to net-borrowing entrepreneurs. Unlike households, entrepreneurs have a probability
of surviving until the next period. This captures the dynamics of firms entering and
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leaving the market and also prevents entrepreneurs from accumulating enough wealth
to become self-funding.
Entrepreneurs use their net worth and funds borrowed from households to purchase
physical capital that they use to produce intermediate goods. Entrepreneurs accumulate
wealth from profits (including capital gains) on capital investments and income from
labour that they supply to the market. In this mechanism, the cost of external funding
to entrepreneurs depends on the fundamental price of capital and the accumulated net
worth of the entrepreneurs. This means that the external finance premium is reduced
as an entrepreneur’s net worth (and ability to fund capital purchases out of the its own
income) increases, and the commensurate agency costs decrease.
Entrepreneurs produce wholesale goods in a competitive market that they sell to re-
tailers who are monopolistically competitive. These retailers repackage these goods at
no cost and re-sell them to households. Retailers’ ability to differentiate goods and
sell them at a mark-up over marginal cost in a monopolistically competitive framework
introduces nominal stickiness in prices. These retailers are owned by households so that
all profits are rebated lump-sum to households.
The key finding of this paper is that credit market frictions amplify the response of
real variables to shocks. Compared to the baseline model with no financial frictions,
an unanticipated 25 basis point decline in the nominal interest rate increases output
by 50% more than the baseline and almost doubles the effect on investment. Further-
more, these impacts are much more persistent than in the baseline. This difference
can be explained by the second round effects the external finance premium generates
in the model. Common to the baseline and financial accelerator model, the decline
in the interest rate stimulates the demand for capital, increasing the price of capi-
tal and investment. In the financial accelerator model, the increased price of capital
raises net worth, reducing the external finance premium, which stimulates even further
investment.
This has a multiplier (or accelerator) effect in the model as increased investment further
buoys asset prices, increasing net worth, thereby reducing the external finance premium
and encouraging further investment. Entrepreneurial net worth gradually returns to
trend as firms leave the market, with the external finance premium likewise gradually
increasing to trend. Nevertheless, it is the persistence in net worth and the external
finance premium that causes these additional dynamics in the model.
This paper also shows that a reduction in interest rates leads to greater output persis-
tence than in the baseline model without relying on modifying the elasticity of labour
supply (namely, by making it much higher). This is due to the countercyclical move-
ment of the external finance premium flattening the marginal cost curve. The paper
therefore argues that introducing credit-market market effects can help explain the ob-
served strength and persistence of an economy’s response to monetary policy - a result
that replicates VAR evidence reasonably well (citation).
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BGG also answered a limitation of the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model by explicitly
incorporating the role of asset prices as collateral into a framework with agency costs. In
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), capital (which is subject to agency costs) is produced from
the output good, but the output good itself is produced (combining capital and labour)
by firms that do not face agency problems in obtaining external finance. Therefore,
changes in net worth affect the economy primarily through changes in the supply of
capital (i.e. low net worth leads to reduced production of capital that period). However,
in BGG, agency costs are faced by entrepreneurs who produce the intermediate good
and also own the capital stock. Therefore, changes in the price of capital directly affect
the entrepreneurs’ net worth and ability to borrow, which more explicitly incorporates
the price asset price effects of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). It also means that shocks
are amplified in BGG relative to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
F.1.4 Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2004)
Aoki et al. (2004) expand on the BGG model to allow for investment in housing. In that
framework, households have the split roles of being both homeowners and consumers.
Homeowners purchase houses using a combination of their net worth and borrowing
from financial intermediaries that they rent to consumers. When borrowing from fi-
nancial intermediaries, they face an external finance premium caused by information
asymmetries, similar to entrpreneurs in BGG. Households in this model also consume
goods and housing services, which are financed through the wage earned by supplying
labour.
Crucially, the homeowner side of the household is also linked to the consumer side via a
transfer that homeowners pay consumers. This captures the trade off that households
face when house prices rise: they can either increase the transfer, in which case con-
sumption today increases; or they can keep transfer payments constant, allowing net
worth to increase, therefore reducing the future external finance premium. How the
household chooses to allocate funds between periods would depend on the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, the sensitivity of the external finance premium to household
net worth, and future income uncertainty. Aoki et al. (2004) assume that there is a
target level of net worth to debt (i.e. leverage). Transfers depend on the deviation
from this target and are increasing in leverage (i.e. as net worth increases relative to a
household’s level of debt).
Households are further divided into patient and impatient households in this model.
Patient households are assumed to have accumulated enough wealth that their con-
sumption can be approximated by the permanent income hypothesis. In contrast,
impatient households are subject to borrowing constraints so limit their consumption
to their current income each period (that is, their income from labour and from trans-
fers). Impatient households can only borrow when the value of their house increases,
giving them increased access to borrowing opportunities.
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Similar to the dynamics in the BGG model, an expansionary monetary policy shock
causes a rise in housing demand, increasing house prices and homeowners’ net worth.
This decreases the external finance premium, which increases housing demand and the
transfer paid to consumers. This higher transfer supports higher consumption (though
the expansion in consumption is muted relative to the increase in housing investment
compared to the model without the financial accelerator). Therefore, the existence of
credit market frictions in this economy amplifies the shocks in the economy.
In addition to embedding housing in a DSGE model with a financial accelerator, this
model also explores the effect of changing access to home equity (i.e. through reduced
transaction costs on home equity withdrawal). This is modelled through changing
the adjustment parameter on the transfer stream between homeowners and consumers
(that is, reducing transaction costs increases the elasticity of the transfer with respect
to housing equity). With an increased elasticity of transfer, the response of house prices
and housing investment to an expansionary monetary policy shock is dampened, while
the impact on consumption is amplified. This shows that when transaction costs are
lower, households use the increased housing equity to finance larger amounts of current
consumption than in the baseline case. This reduces the impact of their improved
balance sheet position on housing investment and house prices.
F.1.5 Christensen and Dib(2008) and Christiano et al (2010)
Christensen and Dib (2008b) develop a model that introduces nominal interest rate
contracts into the financial accelerator framework. They also specify the monetary
policy rule as an adjusted Taylor rule, where the central bank responds to inflation,
output and changes in money growth. With the addition of this type of rule, they
conclude that the role of the financial accelerator in amplifying the propagation of
business cycles diminishes with the ability of monetary policy to stabilise output. This
is consistent with the findings of BGG who further note that the inclusion of the financial
accelerator means that smaller countercyclical movements in interest rates are required
to dampen fluctuations in output.
Christensen et al. (2011) consider a model with nominal debt contracts alone. Compar-
ing the model with and without the financial accelerator, they note only minor variation
in the responses due to the inclusion of the financial accelerator. In particular, they
find that the impact of including an external financing premium on variables’ responses
to demand shocks is negligible and that the fluctuations in investment and output are
only minor compared to the model without the financial accelerator. On this basis,
they conclude that in the presence of nominal debt contracts, the financial accelerator
mechanism can only explain a small part of observed business cycle fluctuations. This
is an important finding as the majority of contracts in developed countries as specified
in nominal terms. In particular, this paper raises questions about the real world appli-
cability of the magnitude impact of the accelerator mechanism on the propagation of
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shocks found in earlier work in the financial accelerator literature.
F.1.6 Limitations of the financial accelerator literature
There are two key limitations of the financial accelerator literature outlined above.
First, the nature of the external finance premium in these models means that there is
no asymmetry in impact of shocks, whereas in the real world we observe credit channels
causing much greater downturn than upturn amplification. Second, because the exter-
nal finance premium faced by borrowers depends entirely on their current net worth
in these models, it does not directly take into account expectations of future economic
conditions. In particular, expectations of future downturn conditions should further in-
crease the external finance premium and amplify the downturn as borrowers struggle to
obtain financing. Moreover, the assumptions of constant length of investment projects
and rates of bankruptcy further limit these models’ ability to evaluate conditions in a
severe economic downturn.
F.2 The Collateral Constraint Channel
DSGE models with a collateral constraint models limit the amount an agent can borrow
to a certain percentage of their underlying assets that they can offer as collateral for
the loan. Therefore, this methodology limits the availability of funding for borrowers
in the model. This can be contrasted with the financial accelerator literature that does
not limit the supply of funds to borrowers but uses price to control demand (i.e. the
cost of external finance is increasing in the quantity required).
F.2.1 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
One of the seminal models in the collateral constraint literature was introduced by
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In this model, there are both patient and impatient firms,
with the latter facing credit constraints on the amount they can borrow to finance
expenditure. These credit constraints arise as lenders cannot force borrowers to replay
their debts unless the debts are secured by underlying collateral (i.e. durable assets).
Therefore, the durable assets in the model play the dual role of serving as factors in
production as well as collateral for loans. The dynamic between the credit constraint
and asset prices provides a powerful intertemporal mechanism for the propagation of
shocks in this model.
Consider a temporary productivity shock that reduces the net worth of all firms in
this economy. Assume that some firms have borrowed heavily against their underlying
assets and therefore are credit constrained, while other firms in the economy are not.
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The credit constrained firms are unable to borrow more in response to the shock, so
instead must cut back on their investment expenditure, including their investment in
durable assets (that provides collateral). As a result, in the following period they have
fewer durable assets (a lower net worth) and earn less revenue as a result of the reduced
investment the previous period, causing them to reduce investment again. This impact
persists, reducing credit constrained firms’ demand for durable goods in subsequent
periods.
In order for markets to clear, unconstrained firms must increased their demand for
durable goods. In order for this to happen, the user cost of the durable goods must fall
(where the user cost in one period is equal to the price of the land that period minus
the discounted value of the land in the following period). It follows that the anticipated
decline in future user costs causes the value of the durable goods in the current period
to fall (as price is equal to the discounted sum of future user costs).
The reduction in the price of durable goods in the current period also has an immediate
impact on the value of the constrained firms’ collateral. Due to their high net worth,
this decline in land value causes credit constrained firms’ net worth to decline sharply,
causing further tightening of investment expenditure. This causes an intertemporal
multiplier effect: the shock causes credit constrained firms’ to reduce their demand
for durable goods in subsequent periods, reducing the user cost of durable goods for
unconstrained firms in those periods, causing a further reduction in the price of durable
goods (and the value of collateral) in the initial period, reducing the net worth of
constrained firms even further. These persistence and amplification effects reinforce
each other showing that even small or short-term shocks to productivity can have
prolonged impacts on production, consumption and the price of capital.
F.2.2 Iacoviello (2005)
Like Christensen et al. (2011) for the financial accelerator literature, Iacoviello (2005)
was sceptical of the use of real contracts in the collateral constraint literature. To
explore the impact of nominal contracts, he includes nominal debt in a DSGE with
housing as collateral. In his model, there are patient households that are net lenders,
and impatient households and entrepreneurs that are net borrowers. Entrepreneurs
produce a homogeneous good (using labour and collateralised real estate) that they
sell to retailers. Retailers repackage the good to differentiate it, and re-sell it in a mo-
nopolistically competitive market, thereby providing the nominal rigidity in the model.
There is also a central bank that follows an interest rate rule.
The transmission of the model is intuitive. Consider a positive demand shock that
causes consumer and asset prices to increase. The rising asset prices increase the value
of collateral, allowing impatient households and entrepreneurs to spend and invest more.
Likewise, the increased consumer prices reduces the real value of outstanding debt in
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the model, improving borrowers’ net worth. This allows borrowers to spend even more,
which further buoys demand (as impatient households and entrepreneurs have a higher
marginal propensity to consume by construction). Higher demand further increases
consumer and asset prices, providing the amplification in the model.
However, for shocks that induce a negative correlation between output and inflation,
consumer price inflation works to dampen the impact of these shocks. For example, an
adverse supply shock increases inflation, reducing the real value of obligations, thereby
improving borrowers’ net worth and dampening the adverse impact of the shock. In this
way, the model features both a financial accelerator for demand shocks and a financial
”decelerator” for demand shocks.
Iacoviello notes that this transmission mechanism allows the model to capture two key
features of the data. First, the observed positive relationship between house prices and
spending is captured by positive demand shocks amplifying spending through higher
collateral values. Second, the use of nominal debt contracts generates hump-shaped
impulse responses that better reflect the dynamics of spending in response to an inflation
shock.
The paper also explores the impact of explicitly including asset prices in the central
bank’s policy rule. Interestingly, Iacoviello finds that this has a negligible impact on
the variation of output and inflation. However, he does find that the introduction of
nominal debt contracts improves the output-variance trade off for the central bank.
This is because during a downturn resources are transferred from lenders to borrowers,
so that the trade offs in the model are not amplified in a downturn scenario.
F.2.3 Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
Developing the model of Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) adds two features
to the housing DSGE literature. First, it incorporates a heterogeneous supply side that
allows either business investment and consumption or housing to be produced from
capital, labour and land (only used for housing production). This creates a trade-
off between business investment and housing in the model that allows for endogenous
dynamics between house prices, business investment, and consumption.
On the demand side, the model follows Iacoviello (2005) in allowing housing to be used
as collateral for loans. This relaxes the household’s budget constraint as house prices
rise so that they may increase their expenditure. Likewise, rising house prices increase
the profitability of producing new houses, encouraging firms to increase the resources
used in housing investment.
This model finds that housing demand shocks and housing technology shocks together
explain roughly half of the cyclical variation in housing investment and house prices.
Monetary policy shocks contribute between 15-20 percent of the volatility. Based on
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this result, it is arguable that macroprudential tools may be effective to the extent that
they reduce cyclical demand for housing, but nevertheless monetary policy remains a
strong driver of cyclical house prices.
Iacoviello and Neri also comments on the impact of spillovers from the housing market
(defined as the nominal, real, and financial frictions that alter housing investment)
have on the rest of the economy. First, they find that the wage and price rigidities they
include in the model more than double the impact of changing housing preferences on
GDP (by making housing investment more sensitive to housing demand). Crucially,
they find that the collateral constraint on household borrowing amplifies the impact of
housing demand and interest rate shocks on consumption. They conclude that dynamics
in the housing market can explain 15 percent of consumption growth in the latter half
of their sample period.
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